Summary
The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court's decrees of specific performance of six agreements to sell agricultural land near Bhopal, reversing the High Court. The plaintiffs had proved the agreements through a co-purchaser who also held their powers of attorney and had been present throughout. The heirs failed to prove forgery or that the vendor was a pardanashin lady. Under the second part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, time ran from notice of refusal, so the suits were in time. Purchasers from the heirs took no better title than their vendors.
Issues
- Whether the agreements to sell executed by the deceased vendor were validly executed and proved, and whether the defendants proved their plea of forgery and fraud.
- Whether an adverse inference arose because most plaintiffs did not enter the witness box and relied on a power of attorney holder who was himself a co-purchaser present at the transaction.
- Whether the suits were barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the agreements fixed no date for performance.
- Whether the vendor, an elderly illiterate woman, was entitled to the protection given to a pardanashin lady when this was neither pleaded nor proved.
- What effect the plaintiffs' possession of the original title deed, the heirs' sale in breach of an interim injunction, and the later transfers had on the claim.
Provisions considered
- Schedule, Article 54, Limitation Act, 1963Article 54 gives three years from the date fixed for performance or, if no date is fixed, from when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. The agreements fixed no date and the vendor never refused. The Court held that the second part of Article 54 applied, and that the High Court erred in counting limitation from the execution of the agreement or the vendor's death. (¶ 30)
- Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882The heirs sold the land while the suit was pending and in breach of the Trial Court's interim injunction, and the buyers later sold it on. Distinguishing Thomson Press and Yogesh Goyanka, the Court held that such pendente lite transferees take subject to the result of the litigation and cannot defeat the plaintiffs' prior contractual rights. (¶¶ 33, 34.7, 34.8, 36)
Held
- The agreements were proved. The evidence came from a co-purchaser present at the transaction, an independent attesting witness, the vendor's registered power of attorney holder, and a handwriting expert. The defendants' own expert could not say the signatures were not the vendor's. The eldest son, said to have been present at execution, was kept out of the witness box. The plea of forgery failed, and the burden of proving fraud lay on the defendants who alleged it. (¶¶ 25, 26, 27, 35.1)
- No adverse inference arose from the plaintiffs not personally testifying. The witness who deposed as plaintiff in his own suit and as attorney for the others was himself a purchaser, and all the agreements were made at the same time and place, so he had personal knowledge of the facts. Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani, Man Kaur, Vidyadhar and Rajesh Kumar were distinguished on this basis. (¶¶ 28, 34.4, 34.5, 35.2)
- The vendor executed a registered general power of attorney in favour of a purchaser's brother, in her son's presence. This raised no suspicion. The purchasers' failure to use it to get sale deeds executed showed their bona fides. (¶ 29)
- The agreements fixed no date for performance and the vendor never refused, so limitation under Article 54 ran from when the plaintiffs had notice of refusal. That was when the heirs sought mutation in their own names. The suits were within time, and the High Court erred in holding them time-barred. (¶ 30)
- The plaintiffs produced the vendor's original 1966 title deed and her revenue passbook (Rin Pustika), and the defendants could not explain this. That showed full consideration had been paid and the transaction was genuine. A purchaser who has paid in full and received the original title deeds would normally have taken possession, so the High Court's finding against possession was untenable. (¶¶ 31, 32)
- Old age and illiteracy alone do not make a woman a pardanashin lady. There was no pleading or evidence that the vendor lived in seclusion, and she had conducted property transactions herself. The attesting witness said the documents were read over and explained to her. Kharbuja Kuer and Krishna Mohan Kul did not apply. (¶¶ 34.2, 34.3)
- An agreement that identifies the land by khasra number, area and location is not void for vagueness merely because it does not state boundaries. (¶ 34.6)
- By knowingly selling the land in breach of the interim injunction, the heirs disentitled themselves from any discretion in their favour. Purchasers from them, and those who bought from those purchasers, get only their vendors' rights and are in no better position. (¶¶ 33, 34.7, 36)
Result
Appeals allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside in all six appeals and the Trial Court's decrees restored. The impleadment and intervention applications of the subsequent purchasers were allowed, and all respondents, including those newly added, were directed to execute sale deeds in favour of the appellants as the Trial Court directed. Amended memo of parties to be filed within four weeks.