Summary
A 78-year-old widow of Bareilly signed a sale deed in favour of a developer but objected before the Sub-Registrar that it was procured by fraud: the area had been nearly doubled to include her house and she had signed an incomplete deed without reading it. The Sub-Registrar refused registration under Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act, 1908. The developer filed an 'appeal' under Section 72; the District Registrar, holding an enquiry under Section 74, found her signatures proved and ordered registration, and the High Court dismissed her writ petition. The Supreme Court allowed her appeal: the mislabelled appeal could be treated as a Section 73 application, but 'execution' means signing with knowledge of and assent to the contents, not mere signing; her plea of fraud raised triable issues beyond the Registrar's summary jurisdiction, and the order directing registration was set aside.
Issues
- Whether an appeal under Section 72 of the Registration Act, 1908 lies against a Sub-Registrar's refusal to register on the ground of denial of execution, and whether a proceeding wrongly labelled as such an appeal can be treated as an application under Section 73.
- Whether an executant's admission of her signatures and thumb impressions on a sale deed amounts to admission of its 'execution' for the purposes of Sections 35, 72, 73 and 74 of the Registration Act.
- Whether the Registrar, in an enquiry under Section 74, may adjudicate a plea that the signatures were procured by fraud and undue influence and direct registration, and whether a writ petition under Article 226 lies against such an order.
Provisions considered
- Sections 34, 35, 58(2), 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76 and 77, Registration Act, 1908Registration requires presentation by a proper person and admission of execution; under Section 35(3)(a) the Sub-Registrar must refuse registration where the purported executant denies execution, and no appeal lies under Section 72 against such a refusal — the remedy is an application under Section 73, on which the Registrar holds a summary, quasi-judicial enquiry under Section 74 into whether the document has been executed and the requirements of law complied with, with power under Section 75(4) to summon witnesses. If the Registrar refuses, a suit lies under Section 77; if he orders registration, the order is amenable to Article 226. (¶¶ 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 63, 64, 65)
- Section 68 (proof of execution of attested documents), Indian Evidence Act, 1872Commentaries on Section 68 and decisions of the Privy Council and High Courts treat execution as signing a document written out, read over and understood, as a consenting party — not merely signing a name — and the same meaning was adopted for the Registration Act. (¶¶ 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56)
- Article 226, Constitution of IndiaAn order of the Registrar directing registration is open to challenge by writ of certiorari for breach of the statutory provisions; the existence of a civil remedy to avoid the document does not divest the writ court of jurisdiction, though it may decline to decide disputed facts. Satya Pal Anand, which concerned the registering officer's lack of power to recall a registration already made, does not govern a case where the Sub-Registrar refused registration and the Registrar's order is impugned. (¶¶ 30, 66, 67)
Held
- Where the Sub-Registrar refuses registration under Section 35(3)(a) on the executant's denial of execution, an appeal under Section 72 is not maintainable and the remedy of the person claiming under the document is an application under Section 73; but the mere mislabelling of a Section 73 application as a Section 72 appeal does not vitiate the proceedings where, in substance, the Registrar conducted an enquiry under Section 74 and both parties participated on that footing — here the appellant herself invoked Section 75(4). (¶¶ 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38)
- 'Execution', undefined in the Registration Act, is not equivalent to signing: the Stamp Act definition is not conclusive, and the consistent view of the Privy Council (Puran Chand Nahatta), the High Courts (Banasettappa Laljichikkanna; Sayyapparaju Surayya; Ebadut Ali; N.M. Ramachandraiah; Kamlabai; Kuttadan Velayudhan) and the textbooks is that execution consists in signing a document written out, read over and understood, by way of assent to its terms. A person who admits her signature but pleads that it was taken on a blank or incomplete paper, by force, or by fraud without understanding the contents, denies execution; signing by both parties raises only a rebuttable presumption of execution (Rajendra Pratap Singh). (¶¶ 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57)
- A purposive construction is required to serve the object of registration — publicity, prevention of forgery and fraud, and reliable public records (Suraj Lamps; Bharat Indu). Conflating signing with execution would compel registration whenever a signature is admitted, throwing the burden on the executant to sue and leaving disputed documents on the public record meanwhile; where a person admits her signature but denies execution, the Sub-Registrar must refuse registration, the Registrar may hold a summary quasi-judicial enquiry under Sections 73 and 74 but does not sit as a civil court, and a party refused registration may sue under Section 77, where the facts can be conclusively adjudicated. (¶¶ 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64)
- The appellant's signing of the sale deed and affixing her fingerprints was never in dispute; the real issue was due execution. Her specific pleas — that the area in the deed was nearly double what was agreed, the boundaries did not correspond, the consideration was grossly undervalued, the deed would also convey her residential house, and the full consideration was unpaid — raised serious triable issues of fraud and undue influence beyond the Registrar's summary jurisdiction, supported by later spot-inspection reports; the Registrar, relying on the scribe, attesting witnesses and a handwriting expert to prove signatures, exceeded his jurisdiction by adjudicating on fraud and directing registration, and the High Court erred in conflating signing with execution. The merits are left to the pending civil and criminal proceedings. (¶¶ 8, 9, 67, 68, 69, 70)
Result
Appeal allowed; the Allahabad High Court's judgment of 31.05.2018 in Writ-C No. 24928 of 2012 set aside and the District Registrar, Bareilly's order of 31.03.2012 directing registration of the sale deed presented on 15.12.2011 quashed, without affecting the pending civil and criminal proceedings concerning the transaction. Pending applications disposed of; no order as to costs.