Summary
The Court withdrew permission for apartment purchasers to pursue a representative consumer complaint for all buyers in the project because the pleadings and reliefs did not establish sameness of interest. Different blocks, periods of delay and responses to offered compensation mattered to that assessment. The complaint itself survived as a joint complaint for the named consumers’ own grievances. Other purchasers could seek joinder if their grievances matched those pleaded, and the intervenors were to be impleaded. The decision did not determine the builder’s liability or award delay compensation.
Issues
- Whether the pleadings established the common interest required to represent all apartment buyers.
- Whether refusal of representative permission required dismissal of the named consumers’ joint complaint.
Provisions considered
- Sections 2(5), 35(1)(a) and (c), and 38(11), Consumer Protection Act, 2019Representative proceedings required sameness of interest; joint complaints confined to named consumers’ own grievances remained permissible. (¶¶ 14-23, 29-41)
- Order I, Rules 1 and 8, including Rule 8 Explanation, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Representative litigation was distinguished from ordinary joinder; common interest had to be established through the pleadings and relief. (¶¶ 16-25, 39-41)
- Section 13(2), General Clauses Act, 1897The singular consumer included the plural absent contextual repugnancy, enabling joint complaints without representative status. (¶ 35-38)
Held
- Representative permission under Section 35(1)(c), read with Order I Rule 8, required numerous consumers having the same interest. Sameness of cause of action did not itself establish that interest, which had to be assessed against the pleaded facts and requested relief. (¶¶ 14-21, 25, 29)
- The complaint lacked relevant allegations for one project block and did not establish common interest across buyers with differing delays and differing acceptance or rejection of compensation. Individual buyers’ other grievances also could not be foreclosed through an inadequately founded representative complaint. (¶¶ 12-13, 21-23)
- The builder’s objection succeeded on these pleadings and circumstances. The Court did not impose a minimum percentage of buyers who must join to obtain representative permission. (¶¶ 5, 21-29, 40)
- A joint complaint pursuing the named consumers’ own grievances differs from one seeking to represent numerous others. Neither the statutory definition of complainant nor the representative-procedure provisions prohibited such a joint complaint; the singular consumer could include plural consumers. (¶ 30-39)
- The complaint was therefore retained for the named respondents. Further purchasers could be impleaded if their grievances were limited to those already projected, and the intervenors were directed to be joined. The underlying compensation claim remained for adjudication. (¶ 40-41)
Result
Appeal allowed; representative permission replaced by treatment as a joint complaint for named consumers, with qualified further joinder and impleadment of intervenors; no costs.