Summary
The Court rejected the view that sexual assault under POCSO requires skin-to-skin contact. Touching through clothing, or another act involving physical contact without penetration, falls within Section 7 when accompanied by sexual intent. It restored the convictions of two accused, imposing three years’ rigorous imprisonment on Satish and five years on Libnus for aggravated assault on a child below twelve. Justice Bhat concurred separately, emphasizing statutory context, dignity and direct as well as indirect contact.
Issues
- Whether Section 7 requires direct skin-to-skin contact or excludes contact through clothing.
- How sexual intent, statutory presumptions and the rules of strict construction apply.
- Whether the proved conduct supported sexual-assault convictions and the aggravated offence.
Provisions considered
- Sections 7 and 8, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012Sexual assault includes the specified touching or other physical contact with sexual intent without penetration; intervening clothing does not exclude liability. (¶¶ 21, 22, 31, 32, 33, 35, 40, 41, 42)
- Sections 9(m) and 10, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012Sexual assault on a child below twelve constituted aggravated sexual assault in Libnus’s case. (¶¶ 23, 24, 43, 46)
- Sections 29 and 30, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012The Court applied the rebuttable statutory presumptions, including culpable mental state, after the prosecution established the basic facts. (¶¶ 27, 36, 42)
- Section 76, Indian Evidence Act, 1872The Registrar General was directed to ensure lawful certification procedures after irregularities in supplied copies of the High Court judgment. (¶¶ 48, 49)
Held
- Both limbs of Section 7 concern acts done with sexual intent. Importing a requirement of bare-skin contact would defeat its language and protective object by excluding contact through clothing or other intervening material. Sexual intent remains a fact-dependent ingredient. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41)
- Strict construction of a penal statute does not justify manufacturing ambiguity or applying ejusdem generis to defeat the enactment. The wording of Section 7 did not present the ambiguity needed for the rule of lenity. (¶¶ 37, 38, 39, 41)
- In Satish’s case, the proved acts and surrounding circumstances established the assault and supported the unrebutted culpable-mental-state presumption. In Libnus’s case, the established conduct involving physical contact with sexual intent against a child below twelve attracted aggravated sexual assault. The seriousness of the minimum sentence did not justify narrowing the offence. (¶¶ 40, 42, 43)
- Justice Bhat’s concurring opinion emphasized the mischief addressed by POCSO and the child’s autonomy and dignity. Section 7 covers direct and indirect touching; the context, purpose and circumstances of contact determine sexual intent. His additional discussion explained the breadth of other physical-contact acts without requiring bare-skin contact. (¶¶ Bhat, J., 6, Bhat, J., 17, Bhat, J., 20, Bhat, J., 23, Bhat, J., 24, Bhat, J., 25, Bhat, J., 29, Bhat, J., 32, Bhat, J., 34)
Result
High Court judgments set aside and Special Court convictions restored. Satish: three years’ rigorous imprisonment and Rs.500 fine under Section 8, with one month’s simple imprisonment in default. Libnus: five years’ rigorous imprisonment and Rs.25,000 fine under Section 10, with six months’ simple imprisonment in default. No separate sentences for the other offences; both directed to surrender within four weeks. Registrar General directed to ensure proper certified-copy procedure.