ROHAN VIJAY NAHAR & ORS. versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. (07/11/2025) — Supreme Court headnote

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Summary

Allowing 96 appeals, the Supreme Court held that the landholders' lands had not vested in the State as 'private forests' under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 merely because notices under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act were published in the 1960s. As held in Godrej & Boyce, vesting under Section 2(f)(iii) needs a served, live notice, and here there was no service, no final Section 35(1) notification, and no possession, inquiry or compensation. The High Court had sidestepped that binding precedent on immaterial distinctions, contrary to Article 141. The mutations treating the lands as private forest were quashed.

Issues

Whether publication of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, without proof of service on the owner and without a final notification under Section 35(1), makes land a 'private forest' under Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA so that it vests in the State under Section 3(1).
Whether the High Court could distinguish Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra because the appellants were subsequent purchasers or had not built on the land, or by relying on material created after the appointed day.
Whether revenue mutation entries can perfect or evidence vesting in the absence of the statutory steps.
Whether the matters should be remanded for an inquiry under Section 6 of the MPFA.

Provisions considered

Section 2(f)(iii), Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975'A notice has been issued under Section 35(3)' was read, following Godrej & Boyce, to require due service on the owner and a live process near the appointed day (30.08.1975); stale, unserved notices do not make land a private forest. (¶¶ 6.2, 10.2, 10.4, 13.1, 14.2)
Section 3(1), Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975Vesting of private forests on the appointed day was held not to have occurred because the statutory predicates were missing; the expropriatory provision was construed strictly. (¶¶ 6.2, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 14.6)
Section 35(1), (3), (4) and (5), Indian Forest Act, 1927 (as amended in Bombay/Maharashtra)A show-cause notice under Section 35(3) must be served in the CPC manner under Section 35(5), since it triggers the owner's right to object and may impose restraints. A draft of a Section 35(1) notification printed beneath a Section 35(3) notice inviting objections is not a concluded Section 35(1) notification. (¶¶ 6.1, 10.2, 13.1, 14.3, 14.4)
Section 34-A, Indian Forest Act, 1927 (as amended in Bombay/Maharashtra)The absence of any declaration of the lands as forest under this provision was held to weaken the State's case further. (¶¶ 6.1, 13.3)
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 22-A, Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975No possession was taken under Section 5, no action was taken under Section 4, no compensation was given under Section 7, and no Section 6 inquiry was held near the appointed day. A restoration under Section 22-A presupposes lawful vesting and its window cannot be reopened decades later. A Section 6 inquiry after half a century was held futile. (¶¶ 13.2, 13.3, 13.5, 14.2)
Article 300-A, Constitution of IndiaNo person may be deprived of property save by authority of law, so each mandatory step in the expropriatory statute must be strictly followed. (¶ 13.3)
Articles 141 and 144, Constitution of IndiaThe law declared by the Supreme Court binds all courts, and courts must apply binding precedent and give effect to appellate directions rather than distinguish them on immaterial facts. (¶¶ 1, 4, 14.5, 14.6)

Held

For land to vest under Section 3(1) of the MPFA on the basis of Section 2(f)(iii), a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act must have been not only issued but served on the landholder. Service alone triggers the owner's right to object, including on the ground that the land is not forest, and obliges the State to consider the objection. (¶ 13.1)
Reproducing a draft Section 35(1) notification beneath a Section 35(3) show-cause notice in the Gazette does not amount to a final Section 35(1) notification; a notice inviting objections cannot coexist with a concluded decision without making the hearing illusory. (¶¶ 13.1, 14.4)
Mutation entries are ministerial; they neither create title in the State nor divest the private owner, and cannot perfect an acquisition lacking its statutory predicates. (¶¶ 13.1, 14.4)
On the facts, the essential links were missing. There was no proof of service, no final Section 35(1) notification, and no contemporaneous action under Sections 4 to 7 of the MPFA; possession remained throughout with private owners recorded as occupants. Post-hoc material such as 2016 satellite imagery and panchnamas, and a nineteenth-century notification raised for the first time on appeal, cannot establish the land's character on the appointed day or support orders on grounds not originally relied on. Restoration under Section 22-A presupposes lawful vesting. (¶¶ 13.2, 13.3)
The ratio of Godrej & Boyce (service, a live process and strict compliance) applies equally to subsequent purchasers and does not depend on whether construction has taken place. Classifying the 96 appeals by derivative or continuing title, acquisition before or after the MPFA, and construction disclosed no legally relevant distinction. (¶¶ 13.4, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3)
Remand for a Section 6 inquiry was refused because, nearly fifty years later, it would be academic, could not cure the absence of a served notice and live process, and would be conducted by authorities who had already taken a concluded litigating stance. (¶ 13.5)
Under Article 141, judicial discipline requires faithful application of binding precedent. A High Court judgment that minimises a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps and distinguishes it on immaterial facts departs from stare decisis. A judge unpersuaded by a precedent must apply it and may record reasons for seeking reconsideration by a larger Bench. (¶¶ 3, 4, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6)

Result

Appeals allowed; the High Court's common judgment set aside and the writ petitions allowed; all mutation orders and declarations treating the lands as private forests quashed, with consequential correction of revenue records; liberty to the State to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.