JUSTICE K. S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Summary

The Constitution Bench upheld the Aadhaar Act and mandatory Aadhaar–PAN linkage by a majority, subject to significant limits. Sikri J., for three judges, restricted welfare authentication, prohibited denial for authentication failure, curtailed retention and private commercial authentication, and invalidated mandatory bank and mobile linking. Bhushan J. broadly concurred but differed on bank linking and certain safeguards. Chandrachud J. dissented, finding the Money Bill route and the Aadhaar framework unconstitutional. The petitions were disposed of; the connected criminal appeal against disclosure orders was allowed.

Issues

1. Whether Aadhaar infringed privacy, dignity and constitutional limits on government.
2. Whether the Act was validly enacted as a Money Bill.
3. What safeguards and limits governed welfare authentication, children, retention, disclosure and private use.
4. Whether mandatory PAN, bank-account and mobile linking were constitutional.
5. Whether pre-Act measures were validated and post-Act notifications violated interim orders.

Provisions considered

• Articles 14 and 21, Constitution of IndiaPrivacy restrictions required lawful authority, a legitimate aim and proportionality. The three-judge opinion upheld the scheme subject to limits; the dissent found safeguards and proportionality inadequate. (¶¶ Sikri J., 117–126, 260–313, Chandrachud J., 198–204, 254–255)
• Articles 110 and 122, Constitution of IndiaThe majority sustained enactment as a Money Bill, treating section 7 as its core and the remaining provisions as incidental. Chandrachud J. dissented on the scope of Article 110 and the deprivation of Rajya Sabha participation. (¶¶ Sikri J., 389–412, 447(6), Bhushan J., 345–364, Chandrachud J., 54–117)
• Sections 3, 7 and 8, Aadhaar Act, 2016The three-judge opinion confined compulsory welfare use to targeted benefits bearing the character of subsidy from the Consolidated Fund, required alternatives for authentication failures, and prescribed protections for children. (¶ Sikri J., 314–332, 447(2)–(3))
• Sections 28–33 and 47, Aadhaar Act, 2016The three-judge opinion read section 33(1) to require hearing of the affected individual, struck section 33(2), and recommended amendment of section 47 to permit victim complaints. (¶ Sikri J., 343–353, 447(4)(e)–(g))
• Regulations 26(c) and 27, Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016The three-judge opinion struck metadata retention under regulation 26(c), rejected five-year archiving and limited retention to six months, subject to court-required retention and pending disputes. (¶ Sikri J., 198–205, 447(4)(a), 447(4)(c))
• Section 57, Aadhaar Act, 2016The three-judge opinion required a lawful purpose subject to review, rejected contractual authority for authentication, and struck private commercial authentication; Bhushan J. also rejected the contractual limb. (¶¶ Sikri J., 355–367, 447(4)(h), Bhushan J., 264–284)
• Section 59, Aadhaar Act, 2016The majority upheld retrospective validation of pre-Act actions; the three-judge opinion required eliciting consent and an exit for persons specifically refusing, subject to section 7. The dissent found the prior defects uncured. (¶¶ Sikri J., 368–373, 447(4)(i), Bhushan J., 285–306, Chandrachud J., 297–322)
• Section 139AA, Income-tax Act, 1961The majority upheld Aadhaar quotation and PAN linkage against the privacy challenge. The dissent treated its validity as dependent on the invalid parent Aadhaar framework. (¶¶ Sikri J., 413–425, 447(7), Bhushan J., 365–377, Chandrachud J., 271–278, 339(16)–(17))
• Rule 9, as amended in 2017, Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005Mandatory Aadhaar linking of bank accounts was invalidated as disproportionate by the three-judge opinion; Chandrachud J. agreed on invalidity, while Bhushan J. upheld the requirement. (¶¶ Sikri J., 426–436, 447(8), Bhushan J., 309–324, Chandrachud J., 286–296)

Held

• Sikri J., writing for Misra CJI, Khanwilkar J. and himself, rejected the facial surveillance and privacy challenges subject to the specified invalidations and safeguards. The limited information collected and the statutory architecture were held proportionate to targeted welfare delivery. This did not adopt a blanket proposition that biometrics attracted no reasonable expectation of privacy. (¶ Sikri J., 151–153, 219–230, 260–313, 447(1)–(2))
• The three-judge opinion confined benefits and services under section 7 to welfare bearing the character of subsidy for deprived sections, with expenditure from the Consolidated Fund. Earned government pension was outside that category. No entitled person could be denied benefits because fingerprints or iris authentication failed; alternative identification had to be provided. CBSE, NEET, JEE and UGC could not impose Aadhaar without legal backing. (¶ Sikri J., 314–322, 447(2))
• Children required parental consent for enrolment; those attaining majority could seek exit if not intending to receive benefits. Aadhaar could not be required for school admission or Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan benefits for children aged six to fourteen. In other covered schemes, lack of an Aadhaar number could not deny a child benefits, and alternative identification was required. (¶ Sikri J., 323–332, 447(3))
• The three-judge opinion struck regulation 26(c) permitting metadata retention and the five-year archival period. Authentication data retention was restricted to six months, subject to court-required retention and pending disputes. Section 33(1) required a hearing for the affected individual in addition to UIDAI and an avenue of challenge; section 33(2) was struck. Amendment permitting victim complaints under section 47 was recommended, rather than that provision being struck down. (¶ Sikri J., 198–205, 343–353, 447(4)(a), 447(4)(c), 447(4)(e)–(g))
• Section 57 could not authorise authentication merely through a contract or permit private commercial exploitation of Aadhaar data. The three-judge opinion required a purpose backed by law, itself open to constitutional challenge. Section 59 was upheld, but consent was to be elicited from pre-Act enrollees; those specifically refusing could exit, while section 7 beneficiaries remained subject to that provision. (¶ Sikri J., 355–373, 447(4)(h)–(i))
• The majority upheld the Money Bill enactment: section 7 was treated as the core provision concerning expenditure from the Consolidated Fund and the remaining provisions as incidental. The three-judge opinion acknowledged judicial review of certification in appropriate circumstances. It also upheld section 139AA after examining the privacy and manifest-arbitrariness challenges. (¶¶ Sikri J., 403–425, 447(6)–(7), Bhushan J., 345–377)
• The three-judge opinion invalidated mandatory Aadhaar linking of bank accounts under the amended Rule 9 as disproportionate. The 23 March 2017 mobile re-verification circular was quashed for want of legal authority and failure of proportionality. Lokniti Foundation had not adjudicated the privacy issue or directed mandatory Aadhaar linking. Post-Act section 7 notifications were not held to constitute contempt; the proceedings and pending applications were disposed of. (¶ Sikri J., 426–448)
• Bhushan J. broadly concurred with sustaining the Act, section 139AA, Money Bill enactment and section 59, and invalidating the contractual limb of section 57 and the mobile circular. He separately upheld mandatory bank linking, five-year archived retention and section 33, differing from the three-judge opinion on those matters. He allowed the connected criminal appeal, setting aside the magistrate’s disclosure order and the related High Court orders because the statutory District Judge requirement was not met. (¶ Bhushan J., 181, 198, 237–252, 282–284, 305–306, 320–324, 342–344, 364–377, 385–392)
• Chandrachud J., dissenting, considered Speaker certification reviewable for constitutional illegality and would invalidate the Act as not satisfying Article 110. He also found the framework disproportionate, with inadequate consent, data safeguards, independent oversight and remedies, and serious exclusion concerns. In his view, sections 7 and 57 were overbroad and section 59 failed to cure pre-Act defects; section 139AA could not survive independently. He agreed that compulsory bank and mobile linking were unconstitutional. (¶ Chandrachud J., 68–117, 145–157, 218–255, 269–278, 284–285, 296–322, 339)
• The dissent would require deletion of telecom-held biometric and Aadhaar details, and would preserve existing central data unused for one year, followed by destruction absent conforming legislation. It also regarded post-Act notifications issued without variation of interim orders as contrary to the rule of law. These proposed directions and conclusions formed part of the dissent, not the majority’s operative orders. (¶ Chandrachud J., 285, 334–339)

Result

Act and section 139AA upheld by majority subject to invalidations, read-downs and safeguards; compulsory bank linking invalidated and mobile circular quashed. Petitions and applications disposed of; connected criminal appeal allowed. Bhushan J. differed on bank linking and some safeguards; Chandrachud J. dissented.