Summary
The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of a husband and in-laws charged with abetting a married woman's suicide, holding that mere harassment or cruelty does not establish abetment and that Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without cogent evidence of cruelty; it also held that where the first informant dies of causes unconnected with the case, the contents of the FIR cannot be proved through the Investigating Officer.
Issues
- Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the accused of offences under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 IPC.
- Whether the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act established abetment of suicide.
- Whether, when the first informant has died before testifying from causes unconnected with the offence, the contents of the FIR can be proved through the Investigating Officer and read in evidence.
Provisions considered
- Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860No cogent evidence showed the accused aided or instigated the deceased to take her life; possible pressure by the husband to re-transfer land was not enough to show she was left with no alternative but suicide. (¶¶ 1, 20, 21, 22, 23)
- Section 113A, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Following Ram Pyarey v. State of U.P., the discretionary presumption ('may presume') requires prior cogent evidence of cruelty or harassment; even with its aid, abetment was not shown. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26)
- Section 32(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872An FIR is not substantive evidence unless it falls within Section 32; it can be used as substantive evidence when the informant's death is connected with the matter, e.g. as a dying declaration where he dies of the injuries. (¶¶ 30, 31, 32, 33, 34)
- Section 67, Indian Evidence Act, 1872The courts below were held wrong in allowing the Investigating Officer to prove the contents of the deceased informant's FIR under Section 67. (¶¶ 28, 35)
- Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Quoted to explain what an FIR is; its role is to set the criminal law in motion and it may corroborate or contradict the informant if he testifies. (¶¶ 29, 30)
Held
- Mere harassment or cruelty is not sufficient to infer abetment of suicide; there must be credible evidence that the accused aided or instigated the deceased in some manner to end her life. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23)
- Unlike Section 113B, Section 113A of the Evidence Act raises only a discretionary presumption, and its condition precedent is cogent evidence of cruelty and harassment; without such evidence the court cannot straightaway presume abetment. (¶¶ 25, 26)
- An FIR is not by itself substantive evidence; it may be used to corroborate the informant under Section 157 or contradict him under Section 145 of the Evidence Act if he testifies, and becomes substantive evidence after the informant's death only if the death has a nexus with the matter, as where he dies of the injuries and it operates as a dying declaration under Section 32(1). (¶¶ 30, 31, 32, 33, 34)
- Where the informant dies a natural death unconnected with the complaint, the contents of the FIR are inadmissible and cannot be proved through the Investigating Officer; he may only identify his and the informant's signatures and depose to the fact that the FIR was registered on a particular date at a particular police station. The trial court and High Court erred in holding that the contents could be proved under Section 67. (¶¶ 34, 35, 36, 37, 38)
Result
Appeal by the deceased's mother dismissed; High Court's acquittal of all four accused upheld.