Summary
An Army colonel was charged under Section 45 of the Army Act for conduct unbecoming an officer, on a fellow officer's complaint that he had stolen the affection of the complainant's wife. Trial by General Court Martial was directed more than three years after the complaint. The Armed Forces Tribunal refused to interfere. The Supreme Court held that the complainant, as the person aggrieved, knew of the alleged offence on the date of his letter. Limitation under Section 122 ran from that date, not from when the court of inquiry later found a prima facie case. The court martial was barred and was set aside. The disciplinary proceedings on the charge-sheet were allowed to continue in accordance with law.
Issues
- Whether, under Section 122 of the Army Act, the three-year limitation for commencing a court martial ran from the date of the aggrieved officer's complaint or from the date a prima facie case was found after the court of inquiry and summary of evidence.
Provisions considered
- Section 122(1), Army Act, 1950No court martial may commence after three years from the offence or, where it was not known, from the earlier of the dates on which the person aggrieved or the competent authority came to know of it; the aggrieved officer's knowledge on the date of his complaint started time running. (¶¶ 7, 8, 9)
- Section 45, Army Act, 1950The charges framed against the appellant were for behaving in a manner unbecoming his position and the character expected of him. (¶¶ 1, 3, 8)
- Section 30(1), Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007The appeal lay against the Tribunal's dismissal of the appellant's original application. (¶ 1)
Held
- For Section 122, both the date on which the person aggrieved learns of the offence and the date on which the competent authority learns of it are relevant, and time runs from whichever is earlier. (¶ 8)
- The complainant's letter expressly reported the appellant's alleged act of stealing his wife's affection and sexually explicit messages, so he had knowledge of the alleged offence on the date of the letter; the contention that knowledge arose only when the court of inquiry prima facie found the offence was rejected. (¶ 9)
- The order directing trial by General Court Martial, passed more than three years after the complainant's letter, was barred by Section 122 and the court martial proceedings were set aside. (¶¶ 9, 10)
- Judicial review of disciplinary proceedings is limited to the decision-making process, so the disciplinary proceedings under the charge-sheet were to continue in accordance with law. (¶ 11)
Result
Appeal partly allowed; the order directing trial by General Court Martial and the court martial proceedings set aside as time-barred under Section 122 of the Army Act; the disciplinary proceedings on the charge-sheet dated 19.11.2018 to continue in accordance with law.