Summary
A three-Judge Bench dismissed a writ petition under Article 32 by retired employees of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation who sought pension under the Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999, repealed by notification dated 02.12.2004 with a saving only for those who had retired before that date. The same claim, and the same grounds, had been decided against similarly situated employees by this Court in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, which was held not to be per incuriam. A judgment of the Supreme Court rendered under Article 136 cannot be challenged directly or collaterally under Article 32; the remedy is review and thereafter a curative petition.
Issues
- Whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable to seek pension under the repealed 1999 Scheme when the entitlement of similarly situated employees was negatived by this Court in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77.
- Whether the decision in Rajesh Chander Sood, upholding the cut-off date of 02.12.2004 in the repeal notification, is per incuriam for ignoring binding precedents on cut-off dates, vested pension rights and Article 300A.
- Whether a judgment of the Supreme Court rendered under Article 136 can be assailed, directly or collaterally, in a proceeding under Article 32.
Provisions considered
- Article 32, Constitution of IndiaThe petitioners invoked Article 32 to claim pension and to contend that Rajesh Chander Sood required reconsideration. Following Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, A.R. Antulay, Rupa Ashok Hurra, Sadhan Kumar Goswami, Omprakash Verma and Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action, the Court held that a decision of this Court, whether at the SLP stage or after grant of leave under Article 136, cannot be challenged directly or collaterally under Article 32, even by persons who were not parties to it. (¶¶ 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32)
- Article 14, Constitution of IndiaThe petitioners argued that the cut-off date of 02.12.2004, which saved the 1999 Scheme only for employees who had retired between 01.04.1999 and that date, divided a homogeneous class without nexus to the object (relying on D.S. Nakara). The Court noted that Rajesh Chander Sood had already considered and rejected the Article 14 challenge, finding the classification reasonable and based on undisputed findings of financial unviability, and declined to reopen it. (¶¶ 16, 17.5, 17.6, 21, 21.3, 22, 23)
- Article 300A, Constitution of IndiaThe petitioners contended that the vested right to pension recognised in Rajesh Chander Sood was property under Article 300A and had been rejected there without analysis. The Court treated this as one of the contentions already advanced and adjudicated in Rajesh Chander Sood, which could not be re-agitated under Article 32. (¶¶ 17.8, 23)
Held
- The decision in Rajesh Chander Sood is not per incuriam. This Court there gave elaborate reasons for reversing the High Court and upholding the cut-off date of 02.12.2004; a judgment does not become per incuriam merely because, in a litigant's view, its reasons are not in sync with previous decisions, and the judgment cannot be said to have ignored any binding precedent. (¶ 22)
- All the contentions now raised were advanced and adjudicated in Rajesh Chander Sood. When this Court set aside the High Court's judgment, which had allowed the claims of the earlier writ petitioners and similarly situated employees, the claims of similarly situated employees such as the present petitioners were also negatived. They cannot seek the same relief again, and there can be no direct or collateral challenge to that decision in a proceeding under Article 32. (¶¶ 3, 16, 21, 23, 32)
- A decision of the Supreme Court, whether at the stage of special leave petition or after grant of leave under Article 136, cannot be assailed directly or collaterally under Article 32, even by persons who were not parties to it. The aggrieved litigant's remedy is to seek review and, if the grievance persists, to invoke the curative jurisdiction subject to its requirements. Finality of a lis is a core facet of a sound judicial system; permitting such writ petitions would mean no end to litigation. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31)
- The preliminary objection to maintainability was taken up with the merits rather than decided at the threshold, and the writ petition was found to be wholly misconceived and dismissed; no costs were imposed since the petitioners are retired employees and senior citizens. (¶¶ 6, 30, 32, 33)
Result
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 179 of 2018 under Article 32 dismissed as wholly misconceived; the decision in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood held binding on the petitioners. No order as to costs.