Summary
The Supreme Court quashed an FIR under Section 376 IPC alleging rape on a false promise of marriage. The FIR was lodged more than five years after the relationship began, the complainant herself described a long relationship in which the two lived as husband and wife with her family's knowledge, and nothing showed a promise that was false from the start. The Section 313 IPC allegation had already been dropped after investigation.
Issues
- Whether the High Court can entertain a petition to quash an FIR under Article 226 and treat it as one under Section 482 CrPC.
- Whether an FIR alleging sexual relations on a promise of marriage, over about five years in which the parties lived as husband and wife, discloses a prima facie case that consent was given under a misconception of fact.
- Whether the High Court erred in declining to quash the FIR.
Provisions considered
- Article 226, Constitution of IndiaRelying on Pepsi Foods, the Court noted that the High Court may exercise judicial review in criminal matters under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC, that the label on the petition is not decisive, and that a petition may be treated as one under Section 482. (¶ 1)
- Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The High Court's reliance on its Full Bench rulings limiting interference with investigation was not wrong in law, but those rulings do not bar the exercise of inherent power in the situations listed in Bhajan Lal. This was a fit case to quash in order to prevent abuse of process. (¶¶ 10, 11, 15)
- Sections 375 and 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860The FIR did not prima facie show consent obtained under a misconception of fact or a promise to marry that was false from the start. It showed a long consensual relationship, and a later refusal to marry could not turn it into rape within Section 375. (¶¶ 9, 14, 15)
- Section 313, Indian Penal Code, 1860After the stay was relaxed, the investigating agency found no material of abortion and dropped this offence. That left only the Section 376 allegation for consideration. (¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 11, 15)
Held
- The High Court may exercise its power to quash criminal proceedings under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC; the label on the petition is not decisive, and a petition under Article 226 may be treated as one under Section 482. (¶ 1)
- The principle that investigation should not be interfered with unless no cognizable offence is disclosed does not exclude the other categories in which Bhajan Lal permits quashing to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. (¶¶ 10, 11)
- There is a clear inconsistency between the FIR's allegation that physical relations were established without consent and its statement that the accused began living with the complainant as her husband. (¶ 9)
- The High Court erred in not asking whether the FIR showed consent given under a misconception of fact or a consensual relationship. Here there was a delay of more than five years in lodging the FIR; the complainant said they lived together as husband and wife for long; and she went with the accused to Varanasi and stayed in hotels with her family's knowledge. This disclosed a long consensual relationship, not a promise to marry that was false from the start, and the later refusal to marry did not make out rape under Section 375 IPC. (¶¶ 12, 13, 14)
- With the Section 313 allegation dropped after investigation, no prima facie case remained under Section 376 IPC, and the High Court should have used its inherent power to quash the FIR. (¶ 15)
Result
Appeal allowed; High Court's order dismissing the writ petition set aside; FIR No. 28/2018 at P.S. Nandganj, District Ghazipur, and all proceedings based on it quashed.