Summary
The Court set aside concurrent findings declaring a murder accused a juvenile on the strength of a transfer certificate from a private school whose headmaster admitted the date of birth was entered on the father's oral say-so. A private school's records are not public documents and its headmaster is not a public servant under the Evidence Act, and the certificate could not be treated as conclusive under Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007 in the face of the statutory family register, the voters' list and a Medical Board report showing the accused to be a major.
Issues
- Whether the date of birth certificate of the first school attended could be treated as conclusive proof of age under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 when its entry rested solely on an oral representation by the accused's father.
- Whether the records of a State-recognised private school and the testimony of its headmaster qualify as a public record, public document or evidence of a public servant under Sections 35 and 74 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
- Whether the court determining juvenility may look beyond the sequence in Rule 12(3) to the family register under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, the voters' list and medical evidence where those contradict the school certificate.
Provisions considered
- Determination of juvenility, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000Juvenility must primarily be determined under the Act and the Rules as applicable at the relevant time, but in appropriate circumstances and for justifiable reasons the court has the discretion to take other relevant materials and factors into account; the benevolent statute cannot be used as a ploy to defeat justice in a grave offence. (¶¶ 13, 23, 26)
- Rule 12(3), Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007The Rule prescribes a sequence: matriculation certificate, then the date of birth certificate of the school first attended, then a birth certificate from a corporation, municipality or panchayat, and only in their absence a Medical Board opinion, the applicable document being conclusive proof. With no matriculation certificate, the first-school certificate was treated as conclusive by the courts below, but the headmaster's deposition that the entry was made on the father's oral representation rendered it unreliable, so it could not be taken as conclusive while discarding the family register, voters' list and medical report. (¶¶ 15, 24, 25)
- Section 35, Indian Evidence Act, 1872An entry in a public or official record stating a relevant fact, made by a public servant in discharge of duty or by a person performing a duty enjoined by law, is relevant. The first school was not a Government school, so neither its headmaster nor its records qualified as a public servant or public record under this section. (¶¶ 7, 19, 21, 22)
- Section 74, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Public documents are the acts or records of acts of sovereign authority, official bodies, tribunals and public officers, and public records of private documents; records of a private, State-recognised school are not public documents. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22)
- Family Register in Form (A) under Rule 2 of the Rules framed under the Act, U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947The family register maintained by the Gram Panchayat is a statutory document, a public record and a public document; its entry recording the accused's year of birth as 1991 was relied on, together with the voters' list and the medical report, to hold that he was not a juvenile. (¶¶ 18, 25)
- Sections 302 and 452, Indian Penal Code, 1860The offences charged in Crime No.385/2011 (murder by shooting the deceased with a country-made pistol, and house-trespass after preparation); the accused is to be tried for them as a major. (¶¶ 3, 14, 26)
Held
- Though juvenility has primarily to be determined under the Juvenile Justice Act and the Rules framed thereunder as applicable at the relevant time, the court examining the issue has, in appropriate circumstances and for justifiable reasons, the discretion to take other relevant materials and factors into account, because the cause of justice must ultimately prevail. (¶ 13)
- The records of a school that is not a Government school (even if State-recognised) are not public documents under Section 74 of the Evidence Act, and its headmaster or principal is not a public servant; such records therefore do not attract Section 35 as entries in a public record. (¶¶ 21, 22)
- A date of birth certificate of the first school attended, which Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the 2007 Rules would otherwise make conclusive, is discredited where the headmaster deposes that the entry was made solely on the father's oral representation, no horoscope or other proof was produced when asked, and a correction was made at the time of leaving; certificates of later schools issued on the basis of that entry meet the same fate. (¶¶ 17, 23, 24)
- An entry in the voters' list is not conclusive proof of age, but it is made on the representation of the person or a parent or guardian, and the absence of any contemporaneous objection to the accused's name appearing in the list has a bearing when rival documents deny juvenility. (¶ 18)
- Following Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan, where an accused in a grave offence seeks statutory shelter as a minor and the documentary evidence of minority gives rise to reasonable doubt, medical evidence based on scientific investigation must be given due weight and precedence over school records; the statutory protection is for genuine juveniles, not accused of mature mind using minority as a shield. (¶ 23)
- On an overall view, the first-school certificate and the three certificates consequentially issued on its basis could not be taken as conclusive proof of date of birth while discarding the statutory family register showing the year of birth as 1991, the 2012 voters' list and the Chief Medical Officer's report estimating the age at about 22 years on 01.12.2012; on those three documents the accused was not a juvenile on the date of the incident and was a major liable to be tried as such. (¶¶ 25, 26)
Result
Appeal allowed. Orders of the High Court (29.03.2016) and Trial Court (19.05.2015) declaring Respondent No.2 a juvenile set aside; he is held a major on the date of the offence and is to be tried as such in Crime No.385/2011, P.S. Kairana. Trial to be concluded by the end of July 2026. Respondent No.2 to appear before the Trial Court within three weeks with liberty to seek bail, failing which the State may take coercive measures; the order releasing him after three years under the Juvenile Justice Act set aside. If convicted, set-off of three years to be given.