Summary
The Supreme Court restored a police screening committee's rejection of a candidate for constable (driver) who had been acquitted, on benefit of doubt, of kidnapping and rape charges. An acquittal on benefit of doubt is not an honourable acquittal, and the Division Bench of the High Court wrongly intruded into the screening committee's discretion to judge suitability.
Issues
- Whether the respondent's acquittal on benefit of doubt was an honourable acquittal that obliged the employer to consider him for appointment as a police constable.
- What is the scope of the screening committee's discretion to reject a candidate for the police force on the basis of criminal antecedents despite an acquittal, and of judicial review over that decision?
Provisions considered
- Sections 363, 366, 366-A and 376, read with Section 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860The respondent had been tried for kidnapping and abducting a minor girl and rape with conspiracy, and acquitted on benefit of doubt. The Court treated these as offences of grave moral turpitude that the screening committee could legitimately weigh against him. (¶¶ 3.1, 5.1.1, 6, 9.1)
- Acquittal (expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'fully acquitted'), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The Court noted that such expressions are not found in the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code and have been coined by judicial decisions, and then explained what distinguishes an honourable acquittal from one on benefit of doubt. (¶¶ 5.2, 5.2.1)
Held
- An honourable acquittal is one where the court, on a full appreciation of the evidence, definitively concludes that the accused did not commit the offence. An acquittal because of a lacuna in the prosecution case or lack of credible evidence, by giving the benefit of doubt, is an acquittal on a technical ground and is not honourable. (¶¶ 5.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3)
- The trial court had held that the charges against the respondent were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and gave him the benefit of doubt, so the High Court's Division Bench was wrong to treat it as an honourable acquittal. (¶¶ 5, 5.1, 5.1.1, 5.2.3, 9.2)
- Acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of a candidate's suitability and does not automatically entitle him to appointment. In recruitment, continuance in service or grant of service benefits, criminal antecedents, involvement in crime, conduct amounting to moral turpitude, registration of a criminal case and the nature of the acquittal are all relevant considerations, and they apply with greater rigour to the police force. (¶¶ 5.5.2, 5.6, 6, 6.1, 7, 7.1)
- The screening committee has wide discretion to reject a candidate; where the facts are stark, mere involvement in an alleged offence or act of moral turpitude may suffice. Courts may interfere only if the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, whimsical or mala fide, and cannot substitute their own view of suitability. (¶¶ 7.1, 7.3, 8, 9)
- Here the committee rejected the respondent because of his involvement in serious offences amounting to moral turpitude, from which he was exonerated only on benefit of doubt. The Single Judge rightly upheld that decision, and the Division Bench wrongly intruded into the committee's discretion by directing reconsideration. (¶¶ 9.1, 9.2)
Result
Appeal allowed; the Division Bench's judgment in the writ appeal set aside, so the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition and the screening committee's rejection stand; pending applications disposed of.