Summary
Following the earlier contempt conviction concerning two tweets, the Court considered the defence and sentence, rejected recall of the conviction, and imposed a nominal fine of one rupee. It held that justification by truth requires public interest and bona fides, which the affidavit did not satisfy on its assessment. The Court distinguished fair criticism from scandalous attacks undermining public confidence. Imprisonment and debarment from Supreme Court practice were directed only in default of payment.
Issues
- Whether the asserted truth defence met the statutory public-interest and bona-fides requirements.
- Whether objections to the proceedings justified recalling the conviction at sentencing.
- What sentence should follow the established contempt.
Provisions considered
- Section 13, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971Applied the public-interest and bona-fides conditions for permitting justification by truth and considered the substantial-interference requirement. (¶¶ 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 50)
Held
- Justification by truth under Section 13(b) requires satisfaction that the defence is in the public interest and the request is bona fide. After examining the reply affidavit at sentencing, the Court found its allegations failed those requirements and aggravated the attack on the institution. (¶¶ 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 50)
- Fair criticism of judgments and good-faith scrutiny of judicial action remain permissible. Freedom of expression is subject to constitutional restrictions, and the Court considered these particular tweets and supporting allegations malicious and scandalous rather than protected fair criticism. A longstanding advocate’s professional responsibilities were relevant to that assessment. (¶¶ 34, 35, 36, 50, 51, 52, 53, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86)
- The contempt was taken up suo motu on the two tweets specifically reproduced in the initiating order. No other part of the private petition supplied the basis of action, and the contemnor understood and answered that basis. Non-supply of that petition therefore did not establish the asserted procedural defect on these facts. (¶¶ 79, 80)
- Judicial decisions must be made according to law, uninfluenced by media opinion or anticipated criticism. Advance publication of the contemnor’s supplementary statement concerning the pending proceedings was treated as improper interference with independent adjudication. (¶¶ 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67)
- The sentencing hearing did not justify recalling the conviction on arguments already addressed. The Court considered the offender, offence, defence, professional standing and conduct, declined to treat the pendency of the earlier contempt petition as a sentencing factor, and held a mere warning insufficient. (¶¶ 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92)
- A nominal fine of one rupee was imposed, payable to the Registry by 15 September 2020. Only upon default would three months’ simple imprisonment and debarment from practising in the Supreme Court for three years follow. (¶¶ 92, 93, 94)
Result
Contemnor sentenced to a fine of Re.1 payable by 15 September 2020; in default, three months’ simple imprisonment and three years’ debarment from Supreme Court practice. Proceedings and pending applications disposed of.