Summary
The Supreme Court restored a disciplinary punishment imposed on a member of Uttar Pradesh’s centralised dairy services. Under the proviso to Rule 15 of the 1984 Dairy Service Rules, the Chairman of the Administrative Committee was the disciplinary authority until the prescribed regulations were framed. The general 1975 Regulations’ requirement of prior Board concurrence could not displace that specific statutory regime. Executive instructions could not override Rule 15, and the same officer’s holding both Chairman and Registrar designations did not invalidate the punishment.
Issues
- Whether prior concurrence of the Co-operative Institutional Service Board was necessary for punishment of a centralised dairy-service employee.
- Whether executive adoption of the general service regulations displaced the specific statutory disciplinary authority.
- Whether the officer’s holding both Chairman and Registrar posts vitiated the punishment.
Provisions considered
- Rule 15 and proviso, Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Dairy Federation and Milk Union Centralised Service Rules, 1984Until the contemplated regulations were enforced, the Chairman of the Administrative Committee was the appointing and disciplinary authority; executive instructions could not import an inconsistent concurrence requirement. (¶¶ 11, 18-30)
- Regulations 87 and 106, Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Employees’ Service Regulations, 1975The general Board-concurrence provision did not govern the disciplinary authority under the specific dairy rules; Regulation 106 did not sustain the alleged inconsistency or removal of difficulty. (¶¶ 7, 12, 18-30, 34)
- Sections 121 and 122, Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965The general regulation-making regime was distinguished from the specific centralised-service regime underlying the 1984 Rules. (¶¶ 6, 20, 25-29)
Held
- The 1979 notification had removed the relevant milk societies from the Institutional Service Board’s control. The 1984 statutory dairy rules specifically governed disciplinary authority, and the subsequent resolution adopting general service conditions did not revive Regulation 87 for that purpose. Under Rule 15’s proviso, the Chairman was competent to impose punishment pending the contemplated regulations. (¶¶ 18-21, 25-29)
- Departmental resolutions and office orders could not displace statutory Rule 15 or impose a requirement inconsistent with it. The 2016 decision to obtain Registrar approval was self-regulatory and had in fact been followed; it did not bring the case under the Board-concurrence requirement. (¶¶ 23-24, 28-30, 33-34)
- The powers attached to the Registrar and Chairman designations. The same individual’s holding both offices did not make their exercise illegal; obtaining approval from the Registrar’s office did not vitiate the proceedings. The Court applied the principle of necessity in assessing the objection. (¶ 31-34)
- The High Court had wrongly treated preliminary enquiries as the operative disciplinary findings. The formal inquiry report was supplied with a show-cause notice and personal hearing was afforded; the Court found no error warranting interference with the punishment. (¶¶ 3-5, 17, 35)
Result
Appeal allowed. High Court orders set aside and employee’s writ petition dismissed; disciplinary punishment restored.