Summary
The Supreme Court rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC a 2009 plaint seeking declaration of title, possession and annulment of decades-old compromise decrees over Yerawada lands conveyed to the appellant trust by a 1938 court auction and a 1952 registered sale deed, holding that on a meaningful reading of the plaint the pleaded date of knowledge was fictional, the claims were hopelessly time-barred under Articles 58, 59, 60 and 65 of the Limitation Act, and a stranger's challenge to the compromise decrees was barred by Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC.
Issues
- Whether a plaint can be rejected as barred by limitation under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, or whether limitation, being a mixed question of law and fact, must await trial.
- Whether the plaintiff's pleaded date of knowledge was a genuine cause of action or an illusion created by clever drafting.
- Whether the reliefs of declaration of title, setting aside of registered sale deeds and compromise decrees, injunction and possession were barred by limitation.
- Whether a stranger to compromise decrees can sue to declare them void.
Provisions considered
- Order VII Rule 11(d), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908A plaint must be rejected where the suit appears from its own averments, read with annexed documents, to be barred by law; the defendant's pleas are irrelevant. Although limitation is generally a mixed question, a plaint glaringly time-barred after stripping away clever drafting can be rejected at the threshold. (¶¶ 11, 12, 18, 26, 27)
- Order XXIII Rule 3A, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908No suit lies to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise was unlawful; following Triloki Nath Singh, the bar applies to third parties, whose only remedy is to approach the court that passed the decree, which was itself foreclosed here by limitation. (¶ 25)
- Articles 58 and 59, Limitation Act, 1963Suits for declaration and for cancelling an instrument or decree must be filed within three years. For a registered document the date of registration is the date of deemed knowledge, so a challenge to the 1938 and 1952 conveyances and later decrees was long barred; at the latest the plaintiff had to sue within three years of majority in 1984. (¶¶ 11, 19.1, 20, 21, 22)
- Article 60, Limitation Act, 1963Though framed for transfers by a guardian, the Court held its three-year period from majority would apply even where a third party alienated a minor's property; the plaintiff, a major by 1984, did not sue within that time. (¶ 19.1)
- Article 65, Limitation Act, 1963A suit for possession based on title must be brought within twelve years; neither the plaintiff nor his predecessors had possession for about a century after the grant, and with the title claim barred the possession claim was also barred. (¶ 23)
- Section 3 (definition of notice, Explanations I and II), Transfer of Property Act, 1882Registration of the court auction conveyance and the 1952 sale deed gave constructive notice from the date of registration, and the appellant's long actual possession operated as notice of its title; the plaintiff's predecessors were therefore fixed with knowledge. (¶¶ 15, 16, 21)
- Section 31, Specific Relief Act, 1963A person against whom an instrument is void or voidable and likely to cause serious injury must sue to have it adjudged so. The sale deeds stood adverse to the plaintiff, who had to seek their cancellation; as alleged misrepresentation went only to contents, not character, they were at most voidable. (¶¶ 19, 22)
Held
- On an Order VII Rule 11 application only the plaint averments and accompanying documents are relevant, read meaningfully and as a whole; if clever drafting creates an illusion of a cause of action, it must be nipped in the bud (T. Arivanandam, Dahiben). (¶¶ 11, 12)
- The plaintiff's claim based on Government resolutions of 1980 and 1984 could not confer rights over property already conveyed in 1938 and 1952; the plaint's averments on the sanad and title were vague and crafted to create a cause of action, and predecessors who never challenged the registered conveyances despite constructive notice must be taken to have acceded to the appellant's title. A registered document is presumed validly executed. (¶¶ 13, 14, 16)
- The pleaded date of knowledge, 02.03.2007, was fictional: the plaint itself showed the plaintiff was well acquainted with the advocate who had appeared in the related proceedings from 2005, and the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands. (¶ 17)
- A document is void only where misrepresentation goes to its character; misrepresentation as to contents makes it voidable. With no allegation of forgery or fabrication and fraud pleaded only vaguely, the conveyances were at most voidable and had to be challenged within limitation (Ningawwa, Prem Singh). (¶¶ 19, 22, 25)
- The right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff's predecessors on the court sale; for registered instruments limitation runs from registration, and a party cannot extend limitation by pleading ignorance of what due diligence would reveal. The declaration, cancellation and possession reliefs were hopelessly time-barred, and the injunction relief, consequential on title, could not be granted to a stranger against the owners. (¶¶ 19.1, 20, 21, 23, 24)
- A stranger to compromise decrees cannot sue to have them declared void, given the bar in Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, which extends to third parties. (¶ 25)
- Although limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of fact and law, where the plaint shows the suit is hopelessly barred, courts should not hesitate to reject it rather than force defendants through trial; the trial court and High Court erred in leaving limitation for trial. (¶¶ 18, 26)
Result
Appeal allowed; orders of the trial court and High Court set aside, the appellants' application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC allowed and the plaint in Special Civil Suit No. 133 of 2009 rejected. No order as to costs.