Summary
The Court rejected claims for railway employment under the discontinued LARSGESS scheme. Both employees had retired on normal superannuation, placing their wards outside the limited exception for employees who had already retired under the scheme before its suspension. The individual claims also failed the relevant eligibility requirements. The High Court’s appointment directions were set aside and the writ petitions dismissed.
Issues
- Whether pending applications and litigation preserved a right to appointment under LARSGESS after its discontinuation.
- Whether the respondents met the limited exception and the scheme’s individual eligibility conditions.
Provisions considered
- Articles 14 and 16, Constitution of IndiaThe Court applied the equality-in-public-employment principles underlying discontinuation of LARSGESS and the binding rejection of vested-right claims under it. (¶¶ 5-10, 16-20, 25)
- Notifications dated 2 January 2004 and 28 September 2018, Railway Board LARSGESS instructionsEligibility was category-specific; the saving exception required actual retirement under the scheme before 27 October 2017 rather than normal superannuation. (¶¶ 7, 19-22)
Held
- The exception after discontinuation did not preserve every pending claim. It covered staff already voluntarily retired under LARSGESS before 27 October 2017, whose wards’ appointments remained incomplete because of formalities. Both respondents’ fathers retired through normal superannuation and did not satisfy that condition. (¶ 17-20)
- Following Manjit, filing an application before discontinuation or pursuing litigation created neither a vested right nor a legitimate expectation of appointment under the scheme. A prior order merely permitting a representation did not confer an appointment entitlement. (¶¶ 8-10, 18-20, 25)
- One respondent was medically unfit for the Trackman category in which his father served. Fitness for a different, lower medical category did not authorise appointment outside the category permitted by the scheme. (¶ 21-22)
- The other claim could not rely on the earlier application notwithstanding the asserted birth-date correction: the applicable divisional notification required a fresh timely application, whereas the later application was submitted after the relevant age limit had been crossed. The Court upheld the Tribunal’s rejection. (¶ 23-25)
- Both appeals were allowed, the High Court judgments directing appointment were set aside and the respondents’ writ petitions dismissed, without costs. (¶ 26)
Result
Appeals allowed; High Court judgments set aside and respondents’ writ petitions dismissed. No order as to costs.