Summary
The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal against a High Court acquittal in a murder case, holding that the High Court's view that the testimony of the deceased's mother and minor brothers was unreliable, owing to material omissions from the FIR and police statements about the alleged oral dying declaration and the assailants' roles, was a reasonably possible view that did not warrant interference.
Issues
- What is the scope of interference by the Supreme Court with a High Court judgment of acquittal rendered in reversal of a trial court conviction.
- Whether the High Court rightly disbelieved the informant mother's evidence of an oral dying declaration, which was absent from the FIR and her police statement.
- Whether omissions in the police statements of the alleged eyewitnesses as to who assaulted the deceased were material contradictions rendering their testimony unreliable.
Provisions considered
- Section 374, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973In an appeal against conviction, the High Court must analyse the evidence and give reasons for accepting or rejecting the trial court's appreciation, distinguishing perversity from the mere possibility of another view; an acquittal so rendered after proper appreciation can be interfered with only if perverse. (¶¶ 7, 8)
- Sections 145 and 157, Indian Evidence Act, 1872The FIR, though not substantive evidence, may be used to corroborate its maker under Section 157 or to contradict the informant under Section 145; omissions of important facts within the informant's knowledge may impeach her credibility. (¶¶ 13, 14, 15, 20)
- Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The informant's and eyewitnesses' previous statements to police were used to bring out omissions regarding the dying declaration and the naming of the assailants with their weapons. (¶¶ 20, 23, 28, 29)
- Section 302 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860The death was concurrently found to be culpable homicide amounting to murder on the medical evidence, but the respondents' conviction under these provisions was not restored as their identity as assailants was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. (¶¶ 3, 24, 25, 26, 29)
Held
- Where the High Court acquits in reversal of a conviction by granting the benefit of doubt after proper appreciation of evidence, interference is justified only for perversity; if the High Court's view is a reasonably possible one, though not the only view, interference with the acquittal is uncalled for. (¶¶ 7, 8, 29)
- An FIR need not contain every detail, but it is not substantive evidence and may be used to corroborate or contradict its maker; whether an omission discredits the informant depends on whether it concerns an important fact within her knowledge. (¶¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)
- An oral dying declaration said to be made to a close relative must be treated with care and caution and must inspire full confidence. The mother's claim was absent from the FIR and her police statement, uncorroborated by the other witnesses, and unsupported by proof that the deceased was fit to speak; the trial court treated it too lightly and the High Court rightly disbelieved her. (¶¶ 17, 19, 20, 23)
- The mother's account of the attack was hearsay, since she learnt of it from her sons and did not witness it. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22)
- The minor brothers' failure to name the accused and their weapons in their police statements, stating these for the first time in court, was a material contradiction going to the core of the prosecution case, not a minor discrepancy; with two other eyewitnesses hostile and no genesis of the incident proved, the High Court's grant of benefit of doubt was a reasonably possible view. (¶¶ 27, 28, 29)
Result
Appeal by the State dismissed; the High Court's judgment of acquittal dated 31.01.2013 upheld.