Summary
The Supreme Court rejected a categorical bar on developers suing for specific performance, but dismissed this developer’s appeal. Under the pre-amendment provision, a developer with an interest in the property could sue subject to precise contractual work and inadequacy of monetary compensation. This agreement created no present interest in the land, left material construction terms vague and involved quantifiable expenditure adequately recompensable in money. The developer declined an alternative monetary claim, so no remand was warranted.
Issues
- Whether section 14(3)(c) categorically barred a developer’s suit against the landowner.
- Whether this development agreement met the conditions for specific performance.
- Whether an alternative monetary remedy required remand.
Provisions considered
- Former section 14(1) and section 14(3)(c), Specific Relief Act, 1963A purposive construction avoided a categorical bar on a developer with an interest in the property suing an owner already in possession. The precision and inadequate-compensation requirements nevertheless had to be satisfied, and were not satisfied here. (¶¶ 11, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28)
Held
- Development agreements varied materially. Their terms, read as a whole, determined whether they merely provided construction for remuneration or created an interest in land or developed property. No uniform rule resolved specific enforceability. (¶¶ 16, 17, 18, 20, 22)
- For a developer with an interest in the property suing the owner, a literal application of former section 14(3)(c)(iii) would create an unintended anomaly. The developer could maintain a suit upon satisfying clauses (i) and (ii), while entitlement to a decree remained a separate question. (¶¶ 23, 24)
- This agreement provided construction costs and remuneration, with recourse to constructed area as security upon non-payment, and created no present interest in land. Its vague work specifications and undefined remuneration failed the precision requirement, while the alleged expenditure could be compensated in money. (¶¶ 21, 25, 26, 27)
- The Court expressly did not examine the effect of the 2018 amendment to section 14. Its analysis concerned the former provision applied to this case. (¶ 28)
- The developer declined to seek alternative monetary relief both below and before the Supreme Court. There was no reason to remand for an unclaimed remedy; the appeal was dismissed without costs. (¶¶ 31, 32)
Result
Appeal dismissed; specific performance refused on the agreement’s facts, without a categorical bar on developers’ suits. No remand for monetary relief that the developer declined to seek. No order as to costs.