Summary
The Court restored the first appellate decrees in disputes over a registered power of attorney and resulting land sales. The plaintiff failed to establish fraud or forgery on the evidence; the High Court had displaced a supported factual view on conjecture in second appeal. The claimed later discovery could not postpone limitation without proof of fraud. The first appellate decree’s limited recognition of the plaintiff’s nine-marla interest was preserved by restoration.
Issues
- Whether the evidence established fraud or forgery in the disputed power of attorney and sale deeds.
- Whether alleged discovery in 2001 postponed limitation and whether second-appellate interference was justified.
Provisions considered
- Sections 68, 69 and 71, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Assessed proof of execution through the scribe, attesting-witness evidence, handwriting identification and corroboration, while noting the limits of substitute proof. (¶¶ 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 53, 54, 58, 59, 61)
- Sections 90 and 4, concerning “may presume”, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Held that the presumption for the thirty-year-old power of attorney was rebuttable and did not prevent a challenge supported by evidence. (¶¶ 66, 67, 69, 70, 71)
- Section 17(1), Limitation Act, 1963Denied fraud-based postponement because existence of fraud was not established. (¶¶ 77, 78, 79, 81)
Held
- Registration supplied a rebuttable presumption of valid execution, placing an initial evidentiary burden on the challenger. The scribe’s testimony and corroborating evidence supported execution. Mere discrepancies, familiarity between the scribe and a defendant, and unsupported allegations of impersonation did not establish fraud on this record. (¶¶ 29, 30, 32, 35, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 63, 80)
- Mere assertion of a fiduciary relationship does not shift the burden: the asserted position of active confidence must be established by tangible evidence. Even assuming a shift here, the defendants’ evidence discharged it. Cordial family relations and joint cultivation did not substantiate the alleged misuse of trust. (¶¶ 39, 40, 41, 42)
- Minor failures of recollection after seventeen years did not justify rejecting otherwise corroborated attestation evidence. Conflicting handwriting opinions were not conclusive, and the plaintiff’s expert opinion alone did not establish copied forgery against the other evidence. (¶¶ 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65)
- A document’s age exceeding thirty years does not make it immune from challenge. The statutory presumption is permissive and rebuttable; the plaintiff failed to rebut it regarding the 1963 power of attorney, on which the parties had long acted. (¶¶ 66, 67, 69, 70, 71)
- The fraud-based extension required proof of fraud and its discovery. Since execution was established and fraud not proved, the claim of later knowledge did not save limitation. Errors concerning the family-function date and the deceased informant’s non-examination did not alter that conclusion; the High Court also incorrectly relied on testimony the informant had never given. (¶¶ 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81)
- Civil proof rests on preponderance of probabilities. The trial and first appellate courts’ supported possible view could not be displaced in second appeal merely because another view seemed possible. The proved power of attorney also left no basis to doubt the subsequent purchasers’ bona fides. (¶¶ 47, 80, 82, 83)
Result
Appeals allowed; High Court judgment and decrees set aside and first appellate judgment and decrees restored, including the limited nine-marla relief already granted there. No costs; pending applications disposed of.