IMRAN PRATAPGADHI versus STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR (28/03/2025) — Supreme Court headnote

AI-generated headnote. Verify against the judgment before relying on it. Paragraph numbers refer to the judgment.

Summary

An FIR was registered against a Member of the Rajya Sabha under Sections 196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita for posting a video of a mass wedding with a poem recited in the background; the Gujarat High Court refused to quash it because the investigation was at a nascent stage. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR: on a plain reading the poem concerned no religion, caste or community and preached meeting injustice with love, so no offence was attracted. It held that for word-based offences punishable with less than seven years the police should normally hold a preliminary inquiry under Section 173(3) BNSS to protect Article 19(1)(a), that the effect of words is judged by the standard of reasonable, strong-minded persons, and that a nascent investigation is no absolute bar to quashing.

Issues

Whether the poem posted by the appellant disclosed, on a plain reading, any offence under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 or 57 of the BNS.
Whether the police were obliged under Section 173(1) BNSS to register an FIR on the information received, and what the scope of a preliminary inquiry under Section 173(3) BNSS is as compared with Section 154 CrPC and Lalita Kumari.
Whether a police officer, in deciding if information about spoken or written words discloses a cognizable offence, may read or hear the words and consider their meaning without that amounting to an impermissible preliminary inquiry.
By what standard the effect of allegedly offensive spoken or written words is to be judged, and whether mens rea is an ingredient of Section 196 BNS.
Whether the High Court can decline to quash an FIR merely because the investigation is at a nascent stage.
What duties Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 19(2) and Article 51-A(a) impose on the police and on constitutional courts in relation to freedom of speech.

Provisions considered

Section 196, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023Attracted only where words promote or attempt to promote disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill-will between religious, racial, language or regional groups, castes or communities (clause (a)), or acts prejudicial to harmony that disturb public tranquillity (clause (b)), or organising drills or similar activity (clause (c)). The poem had nothing to do with any religion, caste or community, only challenged injustice by the ruler, and could not disturb public tranquillity; no clause was attracted. Being pari materia with Section 153-A IPC, mens rea must be read into it, and none could be attributed to the appellant. (¶¶ 13, 14, 26, 33, 34, 42)
Section 197(1), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023Concerns imputations or assertions that a class of persons cannot bear allegiance to the Constitution, should be denied rights as citizens, or false information jeopardising sovereignty; the poem made no imputation about any religious, racial, language or regional group, caste or community and published nothing false or misleading. (¶¶ 15, 16, 31)
Section 299, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023Requires a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings by insulting a religion or religious beliefs; it was described as ridiculous to say the appellant's act was so intended, the poem only telling rulers what the reaction to injustice would be. (¶¶ 17, 31)
Section 302, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023Requires words uttered with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person; on its face inapplicable. (¶¶ 18, 31)
Section 57, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023Punishes abetting the commission of an offence by the public generally or by more than ten persons; even assuming some offence, there was nothing to show abetment of its commission by the public or more than ten persons. It is also the only alleged offence punishable with seven years, so Section 173(3) BNSS remained available for the rest. (¶¶ 19, 28)
Section 173(1), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023Substantially the same as Section 154(1) CrPC: if the information discloses a cognizable offence, registering the FIR is mandatory and no further inquiry is permissible, subject to the exception in sub-section (3). The officer must take the information as correct and determine whether it makes out a cognizable offence; for word-based offences this requires reading or hearing the words and considering their meaning, which is not a preliminary inquiry. (¶¶ 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 42)
Section 173(3), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023A significant departure from Section 154 CrPC: for cognizable offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven, the officer in charge may, with permission of an officer not below DSP, hold a preliminary inquiry within fourteen days to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists, even where a cognizable offence is disclosed. If one is found the FIR must be registered at once; if not, the informant must be told so as to pursue sub-section (4). For word-based offences under laws covered by Article 19(2) this option should always be exercised and permission normally granted. (¶¶ 20, 23, 24, 28, 29, 42)
Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Under Section 154, as held in Lalita Kumari, a preliminary inquiry is permissible only where the information does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the need for an inquiry, and only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed; contrasted with the wider inquiry permitted by Section 173(3) BNSS. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23, 42)
Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2), Constitution of IndiaFreedom of speech and expression is a cardinal constitutional value; Article 19(2) is an exception that must impose only reasonable restrictions and cannot be allowed to overshadow the substantive right. Police officers, as part of the State under Article 12 and as citizens bound by Article 51-A(a), must honour and uphold this freedom when acting on information about word-based offences; courts are duty-bound to protect it even when judges dislike the words. (¶¶ 1, 29, 30, 38, 39, 42)
Article 51-A(a), Constitution of IndiaEvery citizen, including police officers, must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals, which include liberty of thought and expression found in the Preamble; failure to exercise the Section 173(3) option in speech cases defeats this obligation. The State must train and sensitise police officers who are unaware of it. (¶¶ 29, 30, 42)
Section 482 (equivalent to Section 528 BNSS) and Article 226, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973There is no absolute rule that the High Court cannot quash an FIR when the investigation is at a nascent stage; where no offence is made out on the face of it, the High Court can always interfere to prevent abuse of process, depending on the facts and nature of the offence. A blanket embargo would curtail the powers recognised in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. (¶¶ 5, 36, 37, 42)

Held

On a plain reading of the Urdu poem and its English translation, it has nothing to do with any religion, community, region or race, does not affect national integration or the sovereignty, unity, integrity or security of India, and preaches non-violence: that if the fight for rights is met with injustice, injustice will be met with love, and that one should be willing to sacrifice life in that fight. The reference to the 'throne' is a symbolic reference to the rulers responsible for injustice. None of Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 or 57 BNS is attracted, even without recourse to Section 173(3) BNSS. (¶¶ 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 31)
Registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 173(1) BNSS if the information discloses a cognizable offence, but the officer must first examine the information, taking it as correct, to determine whether a cognizable offence is made out. Where the offence alleged depends on spoken or written words (Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 BNS), the officer must read or hear the words and consider their meaning; doing so is not a preliminary inquiry prohibited by Section 173(1). (¶¶ 20, 25, 26, 27, 42)
Section 173(3) BNSS departs from Section 154 CrPC and Lalita Kumari: for cognizable offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven, the police may, with permission of an officer not below DSP, conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists to proceed, even though the information discloses a cognizable offence; the intention is to prevent FIRs in frivolous cases. If a prima facie case is found, the FIR must be registered immediately; otherwise the informant must be informed immediately so as to avail the remedy under Section 173(4). (¶¶ 23, 24, 28, 42)
When an offence covered by a law falling under Article 19(2) is alleged on the basis of spoken or written words and is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, it is always appropriate to exercise the Section 173(3) option and conduct a preliminary inquiry, and the superior officer must normally grant permission; otherwise the police may register an FIR against a person who has merely exercised his right under Article 19(1)(a), defeating the object of Section 173(3) and the police's obligation under Article 51-A(a). Even when acting under Section 173(1), the officer must keep Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) in mind. The State must educate and sensitise police officers who are unaware of these obligations through training programmes. (¶¶ 29, 30, 42)
The effect of spoken or written words alleged to fall under Section 196 BNS must be judged by the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals, not those of weak and oscillating minds, nor of people who always feel insecure or perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position. Section 196 BNS is pari materia with Section 153-A IPC (adding only 'electronic communication'), so the mens rea read into Section 153-A by Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim and Javed Ahmad Hajam must be read into Section 196; the text and context of the poem made it impossible to attribute any mens rea to the appellant. (¶¶ 32, 33, 34, 42)
Where no prima facie case is made out on the sections invoked, registration of the FIR is a mechanical exercise and a clear abuse of process bordering on perversity, and the High Court ought to have nipped the mischief at the threshold. There is no absolute rule that the High Court cannot quash an FIR under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) because the investigation is at a nascent stage; it may always interfere where no offence is made out on the face of it, depending on the facts and the nature of the offence. (¶¶ 35, 36, 37, 42)
Free expression of thoughts and views is integral to a healthy civilised society and to the dignified life guaranteed by Article 21; views must be countered by other views, and the right to express them must be protected even if many dislike them. Literature including poetry, drama, films, stand-up comedy, satire and art make life more meaningful. Judges may not like particular words but are bound to uphold Article 19(1)(a); when the police or executive fail to protect it, courts must step in, and constitutional courts must be at the forefront of protecting fundamental rights and must not be seen to stifle speech. Seventy-five years into the republic, the mere recital of a poem or any form of art or entertainment cannot be alleged to lead to animosity between communities; such a view would stifle legitimate expression. (¶¶ 38, 39, 40, 41, 42)

Result

Appeal allowed. The High Court's order dated 17.01.2025 is quashed and set aside; FIR No. 11202008250014 of 2025 registered with the City A-Division Police Station, Jamnagar, and all further proceedings based on it are quashed. The judgment, authored by Oka J., records that it is based on valuable inputs by Bhuyan J.