Summary
The appellant married on 18.06.2005; her husband died on 15.07.2005. Alleging that her in-laws harassed her out of the matrimonial home and questioned her daughter's paternity, she applied under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Magistrate partly allowed the application; the Sessions Judge reversed, finding she had never lived with the respondents, and the Uttarakhand High Court dismissed her revision, also holding a Domestic Incident Report mandatory. The Supreme Court restored the Magistrate's order: a Domestic Incident Report is not a precondition where the aggrieved person applies herself; every woman in a domestic relationship has a right under Section 17(1) to reside in the shared household irrespective of actual residence; and the relationship need not subsist when the application is filed if the violence relates to it.
Issues
- Whether consideration of a Domestic Incident Report is mandatory before a Magistrate initiates proceedings or grants relief under Sections 18 to 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
- Whether an aggrieved person must have actually resided with the persons against whom domestic violence is alleged at the time of its commission.
- Whether a domestic relationship must subsist between the aggrieved person and the respondent at the time relief is claimed.
Provisions considered
- Section 12(1) and its proviso; Sections 2(e), 2(n), 8, 9 and 10, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005Section 12(1) permits an aggrieved person, a Protection Officer or any other person on her behalf to apply to the Magistrate; the proviso requiring the Magistrate to 'take into consideration any Domestic Incident Report received' applies only where such a report has been received from a Protection Officer or service provider. Reading the proviso as a condition precedent would render the opening words of Section 12(1) otiose and compel every aggrieved person to first approach a Protection Officer, contrary to the object of immediate relief. Rama Singh v. Maya Singh (M.P.) and Ravi Dutta v. Kiran Dutta (Delhi) overruled; the contrary High Court decisions affirmed. (¶¶ 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52)
- Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(s), 3, 17 and 19, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005'Domestic relationship' covers persons who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household when related by consanguinity, marriage, a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or as family members living together as a joint family; Section 17(1), with its non-obstante clause, confers on every such woman a right to reside in the shared household whether or not she has any right, title or interest, while Section 17(2) protects an aggrieved person from eviction or exclusion except by procedure established by law. 'Joint family' is not confined to its Hindu-law meaning. Satish Chander Ahuja, Krishna Bhattacharjee, D. Velusamy and Indra Sarma applied. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 36, 42, 43)
- Function and construction of a proviso, Principles of statutory interpretation (proviso to a main enactment)A proviso ordinarily excepts or qualifies something in the main enactment and cannot nullify it or take away a right it confers; it is construed in relation to the provision to which it is appended, must not be rendered redundant, and where two constructions are possible the one that avoids reducing the legislation to futility is preferred (Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula; Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma; S. Sundaram Pillai; M. Pentiah; Abani Maity; G.P. Singh). (¶¶ 50, 51)
Held
- Section 17(1) confers on every woman in a domestic relationship — a daughter, sister, wife, mother, grandmother, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage, an adopted daughter or any member of a joint family — the right to reside in the shared household whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in it and even in the absence of any act of domestic violence; Section 17(2) is the narrower protection of an aggrieved person against eviction or exclusion except by procedure established by law. The expression requires an expansive interpretation in the Indian societal context, where most women depend for residence on their relations. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 35, 37)
- The right to reside in a shared household is not restricted to actual residence: it includes constructive residence, so a woman who has never lived in the household, or lives elsewhere for a genuine reason, or returns from overseas, or remains in her parental home after marriage, may enforce the right under Section 17(1); if she is resisted or excluded she becomes an aggrieved person and cannot be excluded except in accordance with law. A woman in a domestic relationship by marriage has the right to reside both in her husband's house and in the household of his family in a different location. Bharati Naik (Bombay) and Vandhana v. T. Srikanth (Madras) approved. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41)
- It is not mandatory for the aggrieved person, when related by consanguinity, marriage, a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or as a member of a joint family, to have actually resided with the persons against whom the allegations are levelled at the time of commission of domestic violence; if she has the right to reside in the shared household under Section 17 and becomes a victim of domestic violence she can seek all reliefs under the Act including enforcement of that right under Section 17 read with Section 19. (¶¶ 40, 41, 52)
- Relationships by consanguinity are lifelong, and marriage is lifelong unless dissolved by divorce; judicial separation does not end the domestic relationship, and even after divorce or widowhood a woman subjected to domestic violence relatable to the period of the domestic relationship has remedies under the Act; the same applies to a relationship in the nature of marriage after its cessation and to a fostered girl child in a joint family. 'Domestic relationship' therefore encompasses a past as well as a subsisting relationship: it must have existed vis-à-vis the alleged violence, but need not subsist when the application under Section 12 is filed. (¶¶ 42, 43, 52)
- The appellant, though not living in the shared household when she applied, had lived in a domestic relationship with her husband, had the right to reside in the shared household as a daughter-in-law despite his death, and was forced to leave by her mother-in-law's harassment; she continued in a subsisting domestic relationship by marriage and could not have been excluded from the shared household without valid reason. (¶ 44)
- Section 12 does not make it mandatory for a Magistrate to consider a Domestic Incident Report before passing any order: the 'shall' in the proviso is confined to cases where a report is received from a Protection Officer or service provider; where the aggrieved person applies herself or through an advocate, no report arises and the Magistrate may take cognizance, issue notice and pass ex parte, interim or final orders without one. The High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Delhi (Shambhu Prasad Singh), Gauhati, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh (Ravi Kumar Bajpai) are right; Rama Singh v. Maya Singh and Ravi Dutta v. Kiran Dutta do not lay down correct law and are overruled. (¶¶ 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52)
Result
Appeal allowed; the Uttarakhand High Court's judgment of 23.07.2019 in Criminal Revision No. 186 of 2014 and the Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun's judgment of 11.07.2014 in Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2011 set aside; the order of the Special Judicial Magistrate-I, Dehradun of 12.05.2011 in Miscellaneous Case No. 78 of 2007 (compensation of Rs. 10,000, return of Stridhana articles other than the car, and restraint on obstructing the appellant and her daughter from enjoying her late husband's property) affirmed.