Summary
A teacher was accused of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old Dalit student. The High Court quashed the FIR under Section 482 CrPC on the strength of his compromise with the victim's father. The Supreme Court set that order aside. It held that public-spirited third parties could maintain the special leave petition when neither the State nor the victim's family challenged the order. It also held that POCSO and similar heinous offences affect society and cannot be quashed merely because the accused and the victim's family have settled.
Issues
- Whether a third party to a criminal proceeding has locus standi under Article 136 to challenge a High Court order quashing an FIR on the basis of a compromise.
- Whether the High Court can quash proceedings for heinous and serious offences, such as sexual assault on a child under the POCSO Act, merely because the accused and the victim or her parent have compromised, relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab.
Provisions considered
- Article 136, Constitution of IndiaThe appellants' Article 32 petition had been converted into a special leave petition under Article 136. The Court held that Article 136 is a plenary, residuary power not limited by who may invoke it, so the question of infringement of the appellants' fundamental rights did not arise. A third party may invoke it where there appears to be a miscarriage of justice and neither the State nor the victim or her relatives approach the Court. (¶¶ 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22)
- Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Applying Gian Singh and State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, the Court held that before quashing on the basis of a settlement, the High Court must consider the nature and gravity of the offence and whether the compromise is just, fair and free from undue pressure. Heinous offences that are not private in nature, including those under special statutes, cannot be quashed on compromise. The High Court had quashed the FIR without even referring to the allegations. (¶¶ 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 32, 33)
- Sections 7 and 8; Statement of Objects and Reasons, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012Relying on the Act's objects, the Court held that touching a child's breast with sexual intent is 'sexual assault' under Section 7, punishable with not less than three and up to five years' imprisonment. Such offences are heinous and serious, are offences against society, and should not be cut short by quashing under Section 482 except for compelling reasons, such as a prosecution plainly mala fide or begun only to settle scores. (¶¶ 10, 11, 12, 13, 31)
- Sections 2(wa) and 372 (proviso), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The Court noted that the earlier decisions recognising a private party's right to challenge acquittals under Article 136 came before the 2009 amendment giving victims, including guardians and legal heirs, a right of appeal against acquittal. It held that a third party's right to approach the Court under Article 136 should still be recognised where no 'victim' within that definition approaches the Court. (¶ 20)
Held
- Article 136 confers no right on anyone to invoke the Court's jurisdiction, nor does it bar anyone from invoking it. A third party may challenge an order where there appears to be a miscarriage of justice and neither the State nor any person within the term 'victim' has approached the Court. Once the writ petition was converted into a special leave petition, objections based on cases about third-party standing under Article 32 lost their relevance. (¶¶ 15, 18, 19, 20)
- The appellants had standing for several reasons. The FIR for serious POCSO, IPC and SC/ST Act offences was quashed solely on a compromise, over the public prosecutor's opposition. The State did not challenge the order, and the victim's father, who had compromised and supported the order, would not do so. The appellants were local residents with no alleged ill motive. Offences of this kind, if proved, are offences against society, and their prosecution is in the public interest. (¶¶ 21, 22)
- Before quashing proceedings under Section 482 because the parties have settled, the High Court must consider the nature and gravity of the crime and whether the compromise is just, fair and free from undue pressure. Heinous and serious offences that are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the victim or the victim's family. (¶¶ 24, 25, 28, 29, 32)
- The High Court misread and misapplied Gian Singh. It quashed the FIR without adverting to the allegations or the gravity of the offence, and treated the matter as a private dispute needing harmony. It ignored that the complaint itself recorded the accused pressuring the father not to report, and that the compromise followed within weeks. Sexual assault on a student by a teacher in a school cannot be called a purely private offence. (¶¶ 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32)
- In cases of this nature, the fact that a compromise makes conviction remote and bleak is no ground to cut short the investigation by quashing the FIR and the proceedings under Section 482. (¶ 33)
Result
Appeal allowed. The High Court's order of 04.02.2022 quashing FIR No. 6/2022 was set aside, and the investigation and proceedings were directed to continue against the accused in accordance with law, subject to the report under Section 173(2) CrPC. No observation was made on the merits.