Summary
The Supreme Court set aside appointment of an arbitrator because the contractor’s Section 11 applications were filed beyond limitation. Time ran, at the latest, when the contractual appointing authority failed to appoint within the period demanded in January 2007. Subsequent reminders and a final rejection in November 2010 did not restart it. The Court separately found the underlying claims manifestly time barred, while preserving the distinction between limitation for appointment and limitation of substantive claims.
Issues
- When limitation began for the applications seeking appointment of an arbitrator.
- Whether reminders or a later express rejection restarted limitation, and whether manifestly stale claims could be screened at referral.
Provisions considered
- Section 11(6) and (6A), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996The applications for appointment were themselves out of time; the Court also applied the limited referral-stage test for manifestly stale claims. (¶ 17-21)
- Article 137 and Section 9, Limitation Act, 1963The three-year appointment limitation ran from failure to appoint; subsequent correspondence or rejection did not restart time already running. (¶ 20)
Held
- Limitation for seeking appointment of an arbitrator is distinct from that governing underlying contractual claims. On these facts, failure to appoint by 12 February 2007 started the former at the latest, rendering applications filed on 6 November 2013 barred. (¶¶ 17, 20)
- The authority’s earlier statement that the matter was under consideration, subsequent reminders and eventual rejection did not provide a fresh starting point once limitation had begun. (¶ 20)
- Referral-stage review remains limited: doubtful or contested limitation issues belong to the tribunal. Here the underlying claims were independently manifestly stale, even taking the February 2010 rejection as the starting point. (¶ 18-21)
Result
Appeals allowed; High Court judgment appointing the arbitrator set aside.