Summary
Deciding only the preliminary objection, the Supreme Court held that AERA's appeals under Section 31 of the AERA Act against TDSAT judgments on its tariff orders are maintainable. Tariff determination for aeronautical services under Section 13(1)(a) is a regulatory, not an adjudicatory, function, so AERA is a necessary party before TDSAT in appeals against its tariff orders and can appeal further. The rule that adjudicatory authorities may not defend their own orders on appeal applies only to orders made purely in an adjudicatory capacity.
Issues
- Whether AERA may contest, before TDSAT, an appeal against its order determining tariff for aeronautical services, and then appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 31 of the AERA Act.
- Whether the principle that a judicial or quasi-judicial authority cannot defend its order in appeal bars AERA, and what test decides whether an authority's function is adjudicatory.
- Whether tariff determination by AERA under Section 13(1)(a) is an adjudicatory or a regulatory function.
- Whether Sections 18(4), 18(5) and 31 of the AERA Act exclude AERA from being a party to appeals against its orders.
Provisions considered
- Section 13(1)(a), (1A), (2), (3) and (4), Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008The broad, policy-oriented factors in Section 13(1)(a), with AERA's discretion to weigh them, point to a regulatory function. So do the duty to be consulted on tariffs in bidding documents under (1A), the power to amend tariff in public interest under (2), and the overarching limits in (3). The natural justice requirements in (4) do not make the determination an adjudication, and neither does the proviso allowing different tariffs for different airports. (¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60)
- Section 17, Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008In disputes under Section 17(a), the proviso allowing TDSAT to obtain AERA's opinion reflects AERA's role as a proper party with expertise. In appeals against AERA's orders under Section 17(b), AERA is a regulator interested in the outcome. (¶¶ 9, 62, 63, 64, 65)
- Section 18(2), (4) and (5), Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008Section 18(5) requires copies of TDSAT orders to go to the parties and to the Authority 'as the case may be'. This means AERA receives a copy even when it is not a party; it does not impliedly exclude AERA as a respondent. Reading it otherwise would read down the proviso to Section 17(a). (¶¶ 10, 11, 61, 64, 65)
- Section 31, Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008Section 31 provides an appeal on Section 100 CPC grounds without naming who may appeal. Where an appeal provision is silent, at least the parties to the appeal before the first appellate body may appeal. AERA, a necessary party before TDSAT in tariff appeals, may therefore appeal. (¶¶ 12, 66, 67)
- Order I Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908A necessary party is one without whom the matter cannot effectively proceed; a proper party has an interest in the adjudication. A statutory authority has a legal interest in appeals against orders it made in discharge of its regulatory duty. (¶ 32)
- Sections 53S and 53T, Competition Act, 2002The respondents contrasted the express right of the Competition Commission to appear and appeal with the silence of the AERA Act. The Court held that CCI v. SAIL rested on a functional analysis of the authority's role, and that an authority may be impleaded by necessary implication even without an express provision. (¶¶ 13, 29, 30, 31)
Held
- The bar on a judicial or quasi-judicial authority defending its own order in appeal rests on two ideas: judges speak only through their judgments, and an adjudicator must be neutral and free from bias. It is qualified by the nature of the relief sought and by whether the authority acted as an adjudicator or as a regulator. (¶¶ 17, 20, 23, 24)
- Three principles were laid down. An authority must not be impleaded in an appeal against an order made solely in its adjudicatory function. It must be impleaded as a respondent where the order was made in its regulatory role, because it then has a vital interest in protecting the public interest. It may be impleaded where its domain expertise is needed for effective adjudication. Impleadment may follow by necessary implication from the statutory role even if the statute is silent. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33)
- The 'quasi-judicial' label developed as a way to impose natural justice. Since A.K. Kraipak and Maneka Gandhi, fairness applies to administrative action as well, so the relevant test is whether the authority performed an adjudicatory function, not whether it was quasi-judicial. (¶¶ 37, 41, 42, 43, 44)
- Under Sitaram Sugar and PTC India, price or tariff fixation is generally legislative in character. Whether it is adjudicatory depends on the scheme of the particular statute. Individual application is one relevant factor, but not a decisive one, and a legislative function may still rest on objective criteria. PTC does not hold that all statutory tariff determination is adjudicatory. (¶¶ 48, 50, 51, 52, 59)
- AERA's tariff determination under Section 13(1)(a) is regulatory. The factors it applies are policy considerations weighed with discretion, it may amend tariffs in public interest, and it acts in the public and economic interest of viable airport operation. Statutory natural justice requirements do not change this character. (¶¶ 57, 58, 59, 60)
- In appeals before TDSAT against its tariff orders, AERA is an interested party in a non-personal sense, safeguarding the public interest behind the Act. It is a necessary party and must be impleaded as a respondent. Section 18(5) does not exclude it, and as a party before TDSAT it may appeal under Section 31. (¶¶ 63, 64, 65, 66)
Result
Preliminary objection rejected; AERA's appeals under Section 31 of the AERA Act held maintainable; Registry directed to list the matters before the regular Bench for hearing on merits.