P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY versus THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (16/05/2025) — Supreme Court headnote

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Summary

Former public servants accused in the Andhra Pradesh liquor-policy case (Sections 409, 420, 120-B IPC and Sections 7, 7A, 8, 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act) were refused anticipatory bail: the High Court had judiciously declined relief, custodial interrogation in corruption cases involving influential persons has value that a pre-arrest bail order would defeat, and a prima facie showing of political vendetta is only one relevant factor and does not by itself justify anticipatory bail. The Court disapproved the High Court's view that confessions of co-accused admissible under Section 30 of the Evidence Act can be looked into at the bail stage, and laid down how statements of accused persons under Section 161 CrPC may and may not be used at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail.

Issues

Whether the petitioners, who claimed to be cooperating with the investigation and to be victims of political vendetta, were entitled to anticipatory bail when the High Court had found more than a prima facie case against them.
Whether confessional or disclosure statements of co-accused recorded by the police can be taken into consideration under Section 30 of the Evidence Act at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail.
To what extent a statement of an accused person recorded under Section 161 CrPC, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, may be looked into against a co-accused when deciding bail.

Provisions considered

Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The discretion to grant pre-arrest bail was declined. Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect protected by a Section 438 order, especially in corruption cases involving influential persons; cooperation with the investigation does not by itself warrant anticipatory bail (Sumitha Pradeep), the court must weigh the whole case including the nature of the offence and punishment; and political vendetta is relevant but not sufficient unless the court is convinced more than prima facie that the allegations are frivolous. (¶¶ 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27)
Section 30, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Section 30 permits a proved confession of one person affecting himself and others to be taken into consideration against the others only when they are being tried jointly for the same offence. Its conditions (joint trial, a confession, inculpation of maker and co-accused to the same extent, due proof) must be strictly established; a confession to police excluded by Sections 25 or 26 cannot be rescued by Section 30. Since proof of the confession and a joint trial can exist only at trial, Section 30 cannot be invoked at the anticipatory or regular bail stage, and even then such a confession is only a rule-of-prudence aid to other evidence. (¶¶ 28, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 52, 53)
Sections 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Section 24 renders a confession caused by inducement, threat or promise irrelevant; Sections 28 and 29 are exceptions. Section 25 bars proof of any confession to a police officer and Section 26 bars proof of a confession made in police custody unless before a Magistrate, Section 27 permitting only limited use of discovery facts. A confessional police statement of an accused is therefore per se inadmissible and cannot be relied on at the bail stage or at trial, nor against a co-accused. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33, 40, 43, 53)
Sections 17 and 21, Indian Evidence Act, 1872An admission may be proved only against its maker; the exceptions are confined to civil contexts (joint interest, representatives in interest). A police statement of an accused that amounts to an admission implicating a co-accused therefore cannot be used against that co-accused. (¶¶ 47, 48, 49, 53)
Sections 161 and 162, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973An accused may be examined under Section 161 (Nandini Satpathy), but by Section 162 such a statement cannot be used at any inquiry or trial except, under the proviso, to contradict or re-examine its maker as provided in Section 145 of the Evidence Act (Mahabir Mandal). Decisions permitting courts to look at Section 161 statements for bail (Indresh Kumar, Salim Khan) apply only to statements of witnesses, not of accused persons; an exculpatory statement of an accused may be seen only to cull out his stance or to contradict him if he testifies under Section 315, never against a co-accused. (¶¶ 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53)
Sections 409, 420 and 120-B read with Sections 34 and 37, Indian Penal Code, 1860Offences alleged in Crime No. 21 of 2024 (now Sections 316(5), 318(4), 61(2), 3(5) and 3(8) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) arising from alleged manipulation of liquor procurement orders and kickbacks; the Court did not examine the ingredients, leaving the case to investigation and the regular bail court. (¶¶ 2, 4, 55)
Sections 7, 7A, 8, 13(1)(b) and 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Offences alleged in the FIR against the petitioners as former public servants. The Court observed that in corruption cases concerning influential persons effective custodial interrogation is of tremendous advantage, which a pre-arrest bail order would defeat. (¶¶ 2, 19)

Held

The High Court, having considered the material in detail and found more than a prima facie case, did not fail to exercise its discretion judiciously in refusing anticipatory bail; the Supreme Court declined to exercise its own discretion to grant it. (¶¶ 16, 18)
Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect insulated by a pre-arrest bail order; in corruption cases involving influential persons such interrogation is of great advantage in unearthing concealed material, and anticipatory bail would harm the investigation and the public interest. That the accused have cooperated and been interrogated does not remove the possibility that custodial interrogation may be needed; the court must in any event consider the entire case, including the nature of the offence and its punishment (Sumitha Pradeep). Whether police remand is justified is for the remand court on a prima facie case. (¶¶ 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25)
Although the petitioners made out to some extent a prima facie case of political bias, political vendetta is only one relevant consideration in an anticipatory bail plea. Where rival political groups are at war some element of bias is bound to exist; the court must not ignore the other prima facie material, and may bring political vendetta into account only when it is convinced more than prima facie that the allegations are frivolous and baseless and that frivolity is attributable to the vendetta. (¶ 27)
A confession against a co-accused is not 'evidence' within Section 3 of the Evidence Act (Bhuboni Sahu); under Section 30 it may only be taken into consideration, as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to other evidence against the co-accused (Kashmira Singh). Four conditions must be strictly established: a joint trial for the same offence, a confession, inculpation of the maker and the co-accused to the same extent, and due proof of the confession. It cannot be used to frame charges without other evidence, nor where the maker has been discharged. (¶¶ 34, 35, 36, 37, 38)
The High Court's view that confessions admissible under Section 30 can be looked into at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail was disapproved. Such a confession must first be duly proved against its maker at trial and shown not to be vitiated by Section 24 or barred by Section 25; Section 30 applies only where the accused are actually being tried jointly under Section 223 CrPC, not before charges are framed; and even if it could be seen, there must be other evidence it merely fortifies. A confession excluded by Sections 25 or 26 cannot be made admissible against a co-accused through Section 30. (¶¶ 39, 40, 52)
A statement of an accused under Section 161 CrPC may be inculpatory (a confession or an admission, distinguished per Pakala Narayana Swami) or exculpatory. A confessional police statement is per se inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 and cannot be relied upon at the bail stage or trial, including against a co-accused. An admission by one accused cannot be used against another by virtue of Sections 17 and 21. An exculpatory statement attracts the bar of Section 162 and may be used only to cull out the accused's stance or to contradict him if he testifies under Section 315 CrPC; insofar as it implicates a co-accused it cannot be relied on, as it carries no credibility and cannot be tested by cross-examination. (¶¶ 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53)
Decisions holding that courts should look into Section 161 statements when deciding bail (Indresh Kumar, Salim Khan) concern statements of witnesses, not of accused persons, which stand on a different footing. Before relying on any Section 161 statement for bail the court must first ascertain whether its maker is a witness or an accused or likely to be arrayed as an accused, and should refrain from expressing an opinion on that likelihood so as not to prejudice the investigation. (¶¶ 44, 45, 46, 53)
The investigating agency must not use third-degree methods or coerce witnesses or co-accused into statements suiting the State; any complaint with cogent material will be viewed very seriously by the trial court, High Court or Supreme Court, and a fair, impartial and transparent investigation is expected. The petitioners may approach the High Court for the protection it granted to other witnesses. (¶¶ 54, 57)
If the petitioners are arrested and remanded, any regular bail application is to be decided on its own merits; the principles governing regular bail differ substantially from those for anticipatory bail. In the connected petition of an accused already in judicial custody, whether an investigating officer may seek police remand after judicial remand was left to the court concerned. (¶ 55)

Result

Special Leave Petitions disposed of; anticipatory bail refused in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7532 and 7533 of 2025, with directions against coercive investigation methods and liberty to seek the High Court's protection against ill-treatment and to apply for regular bail on merits if arrested; SLP (Crl.) No. 7534 of 2025 (petitioner already arrested) disposed of leaving the question of police remand after judicial remand and any regular bail application to the court concerned; pending applications disposed of.