SHAURABH KUMAR TRIPATHI versus VIDHI RAWAL (18/05/2025) — Supreme Court headnote

AI-generated headnote. Verify against the judgment before relying on it. Paragraph numbers refer to the judgment.

Summary

The High Court had refused to entertain petitions under Section 482 CrPC to quash an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, reasoning that such proceedings are civil in nature. The Supreme Court held that although proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act are predominantly civil, the Magistrate is a criminal court under Section 6 CrPC and the second limb of Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) empowers the High Court to quash Section 12(1) proceedings or orders under Sections 18 to 23 to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, but that this power must be exercised with great restraint and only in cases of gross illegality or injustice.

Issues

Whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS to quash proceedings initiated by an application under Section 12(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Whether an application under Section 12 of the DV Act is a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 CrPC (Section 223 BNSS).
What is the scope of interference under Section 482 CrPC with proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, given their predominantly civil nature and the object of the Act.

Provisions considered

Section 12, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005An aggrieved person, Protection Officer or other person may apply to the Magistrate for reliefs under Chapter IV; the Magistrate must fix a first hearing ordinarily within three days and issue notice under Section 13(1). The scheme is completely different from a complaint under Section 200 CrPC or Section 223 BNSS, which requires examination of the complainant and taking of cognizance; a Section 12 application is therefore not a complaint. (¶¶ 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 29)
Sections 2(i) and 27, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005'Magistrate' means a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the CrPC, and Section 27 makes that court competent to grant protection and other orders; such courts are criminal courts under Section 6 CrPC (Section 6 BNSS). (¶¶ 16, 23, 23.1, 26, 30.1)
Section 26, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005Reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 may also be sought in pending proceedings before a civil court, family court or criminal court affecting the aggrieved person; Section 26 does not confer jurisdiction on such courts to entertain a Section 12 application. The Court confined its decision to Section 12(1) applications before the Magistrate under Section 27. (¶¶ 24, 24.1, 25)
Section 28, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005Proceedings under Sections 12, 18 to 23 and offences under Section 31 are governed by the CrPC, but Section 28(2) gives the court overriding power to lay down its own procedure for disposing of applications under Section 12 or Section 23(2). (¶¶ 22, 22.1)
Sections 17 to 23, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005The reliefs (residence, protection, monetary, custody and compensation orders and interim orders) are aimed at protecting women from domestic violence; a respondent cannot be sentenced to imprisonment or fine in Section 12(1) proceedings and can be prosecuted only for breach of a protection order, so the consequences are less drastic than setting criminal law in motion. (¶¶ 14, 20, 34)
Section 29, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005An appeal lies to the Court of Session against the Magistrate's orders, unlike orders taking cognizance or issuing process; this is an additional reason for the High Court to exercise caution under Section 482 CrPC. (¶ 36)
Section 482 (Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The first limb (orders necessary to give effect to any order under the Code) does not apply because notices and orders under Sections 12 and 18 to 23 of the DV Act are not orders under the CrPC. The second limb, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or secure the ends of justice, applies because the Magistrate is a criminal court within Section 6; the High Court can therefore quash Section 12(1) proceedings or orders under Sections 18 to 23. (¶¶ 30, 30.1, 31, 32, 39)
Section 6 (Section 6 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Courts of Judicial Magistrates of the first class and Metropolitan Magistrates are criminal courts; under the BNSS there is no category of Metropolitan Magistrate. (¶¶ 26, 30.1)
Section 200 (Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973On a complaint the Magistrate must examine the complainant and witnesses before issuing process and taking cognizance, and Section 223(2) BNSS further requires hearing the accused first; a Section 12 DV Act application, on which notice of hearing is the normal rule, cannot be equated with such a complaint. (¶¶ 18, 21, 29)

Held

An application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005 is not a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 CrPC or Section 223 BNSS. Under Section 12(4) read with Section 13(1) the normal rule is that notice of hearing is issued on the application, and the Magistrate does not examine the complainant or take cognizance as in complaint proceedings. (¶¶ 18, 19, 21, 29)
Notwithstanding the penal provisions in Sections 31 and 33, proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005 are predominantly of a civil nature, as held in Kunapareddy and Prabha Tyagi. (¶¶ 27, 28, 28.1)
The Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class or Metropolitan Magistrate which entertains a Section 12 application under Section 27 of the DV Act is a criminal court within Section 6 CrPC, and 'Court' in Section 482 CrPC refers to such a criminal court. (¶¶ 26, 30.1)
The first limb of Section 482 CrPC (orders necessary to give effect to any order under the Code) cannot apply to Section 12(1) proceedings because the Magistrate's notice and orders under Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act are not orders under the CrPC. The second limb, however, saves the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise secure the ends of justice, and under it the High Court can quash proceedings on a Section 12(1) application or orders passed under Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act. (¶¶ 31, 32, 39)
The DV Act is a welfare legislation to give justice to women suffering domestic violence and to prevent such violence; entertaining a Section 12(1) application does not expose the respondent to imprisonment or fine as in a criminal trial, and an appeal to the Court of Session lies under Section 29. The High Court must therefore be very slow and circumspect, adopt generally a hands-off approach, and interfere under Section 482 CrPC only in cases of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law, otherwise the object of the Act would be defeated. (¶¶ 33, 34, 35, 36, 39)
Decisions of High Courts holding that Section 482 CrPC jurisdiction is unavailable to quash Section 12(1) proceedings on the premise that they are predominantly civil are incorrect; one of the judges acknowledged that a Bombay High Court judgment to which he was party, later found incorrect by a Full Bench of that court, took the same erroneous view. (¶¶ 37, 38, 39)

Result

Appeals allowed; the High Court's order dated 09.05.2024 quashed and the petitions under Section 482 CrPC restored to the High Court's file to be heard afresh and disposed of in the light of this judgment.