Summary
The Court affirmed convictions for the sexual assault and murder of a young child but commuted both death sentences. The proved circumstances formed a complete chain, and murder was established under Section 300 fourthly despite absence of an intention to kill. A lesser punishment was not foreclosed. Article 20(1) also prevented retrospective application of the later, more severe natural-life stipulation under Section 376(2).
Issues
- Whether the proved circumstances established guilt and murder despite absence of an intention to kill.
- Which sentencing provisions applied to the offence committed while the 2013 Ordinance was in force.
- Whether the death sentences should be sustained, including the objections concerning sentencing hearing and circumstantial evidence.
Provisions considered
- Article 20(1), Constitution of IndiaBarred retrospective enhancement of the punishment under Section 376(2), while permitting the substantively unchanged Section 376A punishment. (¶¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 55)
- Sections 376(2) and 376A, as applicable in February 2013, Indian Penal Code, 1860Distinguished the Ordinance and Amendment Act provisions and the sentencing consequences applicable to this offence. (¶¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 22, 55, 57)
- Section 300 fourthly, Indian Penal Code, 1860Applied knowledge of the imminently dangerous consequences of the assault to uphold the murder conviction. (¶¶ 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 53, 54)
- Sections 5(j), 5(m) and 6, before the 2019 amendment, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012Affirmed the aggravated-assault conviction and applied the earlier punishment rather than the later amendment. (¶¶ 12, 15, 22, 57)
- Section 235(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Required an effective sentencing opportunity; same-day sentencing did not itself mandate commutation or remand, and an adequate opportunity was afforded on appeal. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33, 34)
Held
- The proved circumstances, including custody of the child, discovery beside the accused, medical evidence and the victim’s blood on his trousers, established a complete chain excluding innocence. Some asserted circumstances about footwear, flesh and semen were not proved, but that did not defeat the independently sufficient chain. (¶¶ 18, 18.1, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4, 18.5, 18.6, 18.7, 19, 20, 21, 22)
- The later statutory stipulation making Section 376(2) life imprisonment the remainder of natural life restricted statutory remission and imposed a greater punishment retrospectively, contrary to Article 20(1). It could not apply to this February 2013 offence; the pre-2019 POCSO punishment likewise governed. Section 376A’s punishment was already substantively identical under the Ordinance, so its application did not offend Article 20(1). (¶¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)
- An intention to kill was not necessary to establish murder under Section 300 fourthly. Given the victim’s age and the nature of the assault, the accused must have known its imminently dangerous consequences. The conviction for murder was sustained on that basis. (¶¶ 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29)
- Same-day conviction and sentence do not automatically vitiate sentencing. An effective opportunity to present sentencing material is necessary, but the appellate court can remedy a deficiency. The appellant had adequate opportunity before this Court; that objection did not itself justify commutation. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33, 34)
- Circumstantial evidence does not absolutely preclude death punishment. It must be unimpeachable, establish an exceptional case and convincingly foreclose a lesser sentence. The Court questioned the theoretical place of residual doubt after a complete circumstantial chain, while requiring the higher or stricter scrutiny described in the sentencing precedents. (¶¶ 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52)
- Although guilt was established by unimpeachable evidence and the crime was exceptional, a lesser sentence was not foreclosed. No injury was consciously inflicted with an intention to extinguish life, and the murder conviction rested on Section 300 fourthly. Death was replaced by life imprisonment for murder and 25 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 376A. The remaining mitigation submissions did not require decision. (¶¶ 53, 54, 55, 56, 57)
Result
Appeals partly allowed. Convictions affirmed; death sentences commuted to life imprisonment under Section 302 and 25 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 376A. Convictions and sentences under Section 376 and Section 6 POCSO otherwise affirmed, subject to the judgment’s ruling on the applicable punishment.