Summary
In this 2019 decision, the Supreme Court set aside arbitrator appointments after finding that two insurance claims had been voluntarily settled with accord and satisfaction. A discharge voucher was not invariably a bar to arbitration, but the insured’s later unsupported allegations of coercion did not establish a genuine surviving dispute. The Court rejected mechanical appointment based solely on an undisputed arbitration clause in the circumstances before it.
Issues
- Whether the discharge vouchers conclusively barred arbitration regardless of circumstances.
- Whether the insured supplied prima facie support for alleged coercion.
- Whether the High Court properly appointed an arbitrator after settlement.
Held
- There is no absolute rule that a full-and-final receipt precludes arbitration. A genuine challenge based on fraud, coercion or undue influence requires assessment of the circumstances; a voluntary settlement differs from a coerced release. (¶ 12–17)
- The insured accepted the computed settlements and furnished discharge documents without protest, later sought and obtained calculation details, and only subsequently alleged coercion without supporting prima facie evidence. Financial distress asserted in general terms was insufficient on this record. (¶¶ 18–19, 21)
- The Court treated appointment as a judicial exercise and distinguished Duro Felguera’s context. Finding that no arbitral dispute survived the voluntary settlements, it held that the High Court had mechanically appointed an arbitrator without adequate basis. (¶ 20–23)
Result
Insurer’s appeals allowed without costs. High Court orders appointing an arbitrator set aside; pending applications disposed of.