Summary
Profanity and vulgarity are not by themselves obscenity under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act. Applying contemporary community standards to College Romance in context, the Court found neither prurient content nor sexually explicit acts or conduct attracting Section 67A. Courtroom decorum, linguistic purity and the sensitivities of children or hypersensitive viewers were inappropriate substitutes for the statutory test. The appeals were allowed and the FIR against the actors, creators and associated appellants quashed.
Issues
- Whether vulgar expletives in the web-series constituted statutory obscenity.
- What perspective and contextual assessment govern the community-standards test.
- Whether the complaint disclosed sexually explicit acts or conduct under Section 67A.
Provisions considered
- Section 67, Information Technology Act, 2000Electronic content must satisfy the statutory obscenity requirements; vulgar or offensive language alone did not do so when assessed in the work’s context and through contemporary community standards. (¶¶ 10, 12, 27, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43)
- Section 67A, Information Technology Act, 2000The complaint about profanity did not disclose sexually explicit acts or conduct, and the High Court had given no sufficient reason to attract this provision. (¶¶ 44, 45, 46, 47, 48)
- Section 292, Indian Penal Code, 1860The similarly worded obscenity definition and its judicial interpretation informed Section 67, the special provision applicable to electronic publication in this case. (¶¶ 11, 12, 13, 18, 25, 26, 27)
- Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Where the complaint taken at face value disclosed neither alleged offence, inherent jurisdiction warranted quashing the resulting FIR. (¶¶ 2, 48, 49)
- Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of IndiaCriminalising profanity as obscenity to address concerns over children’s access would disproportionately restrict speech, expression and artistic creativity. (¶¶ 41, 42)
Held
- The statutory inquiry is whether content is lascivious, appeals to prurient interest or tends to deprave and corrupt its likely audience. It is not whether the language is decent or commonly spoken. Profanity may shock, disgust or offend without being obscene. (¶¶ 10, 12, 18, 34, 35)
- The contemporary community-standards test requires an objective assessment of the work as a whole and the disputed portions in context, appreciating the creator’s purpose and the likely effect on an ordinary viewer. Isolated literal meanings cannot replace contextual understanding. The applicable perspective is an ordinarily prudent person, rather than a child, hypersensitive viewer or judicial officer maintaining courtroom decorum. (¶¶ 19, 25, 27, 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41)
- In the light-hearted college-life series, the disputed expletives expressed emotions such as anger or frustration. Their literal sexual meanings were neither intended nor the effect on an ordinary reasonable viewer. The High Court wrongly equated vulgarity with obscenity and relied on linguistic morality and its own discomfort instead of the statutory inquiry. (¶¶ 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43)
- Concern about unrestricted access by children did not justify converting profanity into a criminal obscenity offence. That would be a disproportionate restriction on speech and artistic expression. The Court did not make a separate final ruling on the procedural challenge concerning Sections 154(3) and 156(3). (¶¶ 6, 42, 48, 49)
- The complaint alleged excessive vulgar language, not sexually explicit acts or conduct. Section 67A was therefore not attracted. The Court discussed the possible relationship between Sections 67 and 67A, but its decision rested on the absence of the alleged statutory content in this case. (¶¶ 44, 45, 46, 47, 48)
- Because the allegations taken at face value disclosed neither offence, the appeals were allowed, the High Court judgment set aside and FIR 403/2023 at Mukherjee Nagar under Sections 67 and 67A quashed against the appellants. (¶¶ 48, 49, 50)
Result
Appeals allowed; High Court judgment set aside. FIR 403/2023 dated 16 April 2023 at Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi, under Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act quashed against the appellants; pending applications disposed of.