Summary
The Supreme Court restored a possession decree, holding the suit timely under Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920. In this setting, obtaining the declaratory decree included its formal preparation, so the suit filed within three years of the 1972 decree sheet was within time. Alternatively, time spent pursuing execution in good faith was excludable under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The special law did not exclude that protection, and the intervening four months after execution ended required no separate condonation.
Issues
- When limitation began under the special provision referring to the declaratory decree being obtained.
- Whether unsuccessful good-faith execution proceedings qualified for exclusion of time.
- Whether the special Punjab limitation law displaced section 14.
Provisions considered
- Schedule, Article 2(b), Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920The three-year period ran from accrual of the right to sue or obtaining the declaratory decree, whichever was later. In this conditional-decree setting obtaining included formal preparation of the decree sheet, not merely pronouncement of the earlier declaratory judgment. (¶¶ 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20)
- Section 5, Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920The express application of limitation-saving provisions supported section 14 relief; the special law did not expressly exclude it. (¶¶ 24, 26)
- Section 29(2), Limitation Act, 1963The special limitation period did not by itself displace the unexcluded saving provisions. Read with the special Act’s section 5, section 14 applied to the good-faith mistaken-remedy proceedings here. (¶¶ 25, 26)
Held
- The special statute used the expression that the declaratory decree is obtained, rather than the judgment is pronounced, and expressly chose the later date. The formal decree sheet was prepared on 19 August 1972; the possession suit filed on 11 June 1974 was therefore timely. The High Court wrongly treated relation back to the 1963 judgment as decisive. (¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 28)
- Even assuming time began on the predecessor’s death in January 1971, good-faith execution proceedings were civil proceedings ending for a jurisdictional defect or a cause of like nature because possession required a separate suit. The findings of good faith remained undisturbed. Excluding the relevant period through 2 February 1974 left the June suit within time, so the subsequent four months required no separate explanation as delay. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23)
- Section 14 was applicable through the special Act’s saving clause and section 29(2), with no express exclusion in the 1920 Act. The trial and first appellate possession decree was consequently restored. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30)
Result
Appeal allowed without costs; High Court judgment and decree set aside and trial decree, as affirmed by the first appellate court, restored.