Summary
The Court rejected the claim that repeal of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act automatically substituted the later Act’s lesser punishment, because the repeal provision preserved prosecution and penalties. Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint: the company had not been convicted, the nominated officer’s derivative conviction could not stand alone, and a prejudicial remand without hearing the company was invalid and unfair after more than thirty years.
Issues
- Whether the later Food Safety and Standards Act’s punishment displaced the saved prosecution and punishment under the repealed Act.
- Whether the nominated officer’s conviction and the High Court’s remand could stand without a company conviction and hearing.
Provisions considered
- Section 97(1)(iii) and (iv), Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006Applied the express saving of penalties, punishment, investigation and legal proceedings under the repealed enactment. (¶¶ 13, 15, 17, 18)
- Section 401(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Held that the revisional remand prejudicing the company required an opportunity of hearing. (¶¶ 12, 19)
- Section 17(1), Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954Construed the company’s and nominated person’s liabilities conjointly and held the nominated officer’s conviction unsustainable in the absence of the company’s conviction on this record. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22)
Held
- This was repeal with an express saving of prior liabilities, prosecution and punishment, rather than an amendment reducing punishment within the same enactment. The later Act’s lesser punishment therefore did not replace the saved regime. The contrary relief in Trilok Chand was confined to its facts because the saving provision had not been brought to the Court’s attention. (¶¶ 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18)
- The company was not represented through the trial and no conviction was entered against it. The High Court could not order a prejudicial remand against the company without hearing it as required by Section 401(2). (¶¶ 3, 6, 12, 19)
- Section 17(1)’s provisions concerning the nominated person and the company operate conjointly. The company’s non-conviction rendered the nominated officer’s conviction unsustainable here. Remanding to cure that fundamental lacuna after more than thirty years of proceedings was not a fair course. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 23)
Result
Appeals allowed; High Court remand order set aside and complaint dismissed. Relief was granted on the company-liability and remand grounds, not by applying the later Act’s lesser punishment.