Summary
The State's appeal against the High Court's acquittal of a public servant convicted under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was dismissed. The Court found the complainant's testimony unreliable and the only other witness to the demand incoherent, held that the chain of demand, acceptance and recovery was incomplete because the demand itself was not proved, and that the Section 20 presumption therefore had no application.
Issues
- Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 1,500 from the complainant.
- Whether the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 arises merely on proof of acceptance and recovery of money when the demand is not proved.
- Whether the High Court's reversal of the conviction, though lacking detailed factual reasoning, warranted interference by the Supreme Court.
Provisions considered
- Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Conviction under these provisions requires the prosecution to complete the entire chain of demand, acceptance and recovery; where the initial demand is itself suspicious, proof of payment and recovery alone does not complete the chain. Penal law must be strictly construed. (¶¶ 1, 25, 27)
- Section 20, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988The presumption that gratification was accepted as motive or reward applies only once demand is proved; a reverse onus cannot be used to cast an uncalled-for burden on the accused. Since demand was not proved, the presumption and the decision in State of Karnataka v. Chandrasha did not apply. (¶¶ 9, 10, 25)
Held
- Apart from the complainant (PW1), only PW2 referred to a demand, and his deposition was incoherent and self-contradictory: he first said he had not heard the conversation in the respondent's chamber, then said he witnessed the demand and the handing over, and then said he did not know whether the respondent had asked for the money. The benefit of that unclear testimony goes to the respondent. (¶¶ 21, 23)
- The complainant's own testimony did not inspire confidence: he denied any knowledge of the spot inspection conducted two days before the trap, yet when confronted with the report (Exhibit D8) he immediately admitted it and identified his own, his father's and the witness's signatures. Such conduct renders his evidence unreliable as the sole basis for conviction. (¶¶ 24, 26)
- On the prosecution's own case the respondent told the complainant, when he returned with the money at 5:30 PM, that the file had already been forwarded; there was thus no occasion to pay a bribe for work already done. The mere fact that money changed hands cannot ipso facto be presumed to be pursuant to a demand, because conviction under the Act requires the whole chain of demand, acceptance and recovery to be established. (¶¶ 22, 25)
- Where demand is not proved, the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act does not operate against the accused; a reverse onus under a statute cannot be stretched into a presumption casting an uncalled-for burden on the accused. (¶ 25)
- Although the High Court ought to have given detailed factual reasons for overturning a conviction, its acquittal could not be termed perverse or unwarranted because the demand was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; the Supreme Court, applying its mind independently to all material aspects, agreed with the High Court's conclusion. (¶¶ 27, 28)
Result
Appeal dismissed; the High Court's judgment acquitting the respondent upheld; no order as to costs.