Summary
The Court restored refusal to condone delay in two applications to set aside arbitral awards. Section 34(3) permits three months from receipt, with only a further thirty days on sufficient cause; Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot extend that limit. The borrowers had admittedly refused registered envelopes containing signed awards and were deemed served on that date. Their later receipt of execution notices did not restart limitation. General appeals to a liberal approach or the merits of their defence could not confer an excluded power to condone delay.
Issues
- Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act could excuse filing beyond the extended period under Section 34(3).
- Whether admitted refusal of signed awards prevented service from starting limitation.
Provisions considered
- Section 34(3) and proviso, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996The court could condone delay only within thirty days after the prescribed three months, on sufficient cause. (¶¶ 6-7.3, 10)
- Sections 5 and 29(2), Limitation Act, 1963The special limitation provision excluded the general power to condone delay beyond its stipulated extension. (¶¶ 7-7.3, 10)
Held
- The words limiting extension to a further thirty days excluded Section 5. Even sufficient cause could not authorise entertainment of an application filed beyond three months plus thirty days. (¶ 6-7.3)
- The signed awards had been sent by registered post and the borrowers admitted refusing the envelopes. On the established facts, refusal constituted service, so limitation ran from that refusal rather than subsequent execution notices. (¶ 8-9)
- A liberal approach to condonation is available only where the relevant power exists. The borrowers’ occupation and assertion that no money was due could not overcome the statutory bar. The Division Bench’s condonation was therefore unsustainable. (¶ 10)
Result
Appeals allowed without costs; Division Bench order set aside and Single Judge’s refusal to condone delay restored.