Summary
Two employees of an interior-decoration contractor were electrocuted and died while working on a shop sign board from an iron ladder; the contractor and the shop's store manager were charged under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC for not providing safety equipment, and their discharge applications were rejected by the trial court and the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court held that even taking the allegations as correct there was neither intention nor knowledge that the act was likely to cause death, so no prima facie case of culpable homicide (or even of Section 304A) was made out, and discharged the appellants.
Issues
- Whether, taking the prosecution allegations as correct, a prima facie case under Section 304 Part II IPC was made out against the contractor and store manager for the accidental electrocution of two workers who had not been provided safety equipment.
- What the court must consider at the stage of a discharge application under Section 227 CrPC.
- Whether the decision in Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P. (Bhopal gas tragedy) supported continuation of the prosecution.
Provisions considered
- Section 304 Part II, Indian Penal Code, 1860Punishes culpable homicide not amounting to murder where the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The Court identified the ingredients as (i) culpable homicide not amounting to murder, (ii) knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, and (iii) absence of intention; the basic ingredient is presence of knowledge and absence of intention. Found absent on the facts. (¶¶ 12, 12.1, 12.4, 14, 15)
- Section 299, Indian Penal Code, 1860Defines culpable homicide as causing death by an act done with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. The Court stressed that a positive act with such intention or knowledge is essential, so intention or knowledge is of crucial importance; all culpable homicides are murder save those excepted by Section 300. (¶¶ 12.2, 12.3)
- Section 304A, Indian Penal Code, 1860Causing death by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide. The police had chargesheeted the appellants under this section, but the committing Magistrate confined the case to Section 304 Part II. The Court held that on the basic facts the deaths were purely accidental and no prima facie case was made out even under Section 304A. (¶¶ 4.4, 4.5, 9.1, 17.1, 17.3)
- Section 227, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The judge must discharge the accused, recording reasons, if on considering the record and documents and hearing both sides there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. The Court held that at this stage no threadbare analysis of the prosecution material is required; the only question is whether the material is sufficient to justify launching a criminal trial. (¶¶ 5, 16)
Held
- To commit culpable homicide, a positive act must be done with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death; intention or knowledge is of crucial importance. Section 304 Part II IPC is attracted only where the doer has knowledge that the act is likely to cause death but no intention to cause it; its basic ingredient is presence of knowledge and absence of intention. (¶¶ 12.3, 12.4)
- Even taking the allegation as correct that the appellants did not provide safety shoes, belts and the like and gave only an iron ladder to the two employees working on a sign board about twelve feet high, there was no intention to cause death or bodily injury likely to cause death, and it could not be said that the appellants knew that asking the employees to do that work was likely to cause their death. No prima facie case of culpable homicide was made out, so the ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC were absent. (¶¶ 13, 14, 15)
- At the stage of considering discharge under Section 227 CrPC the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the prosecution's materials; it need only see whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed, that is, whether the material is sufficient to initiate a criminal trial, even though the accused may ultimately be acquitted. A discharge is on a higher pedestal than an acquittal: acquittal comes at the end of the trial, perhaps on a technicality or benefit of doubt, whereas discharge means there is no material to justify launching a trial, and once discharged the person is no longer an accused. (¶ 16)
- Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P. was of no assistance to the prosecution. That case arose from the Bhopal gas tragedy; this Court there held that charges under Sections 304 Part II, 324, 326 and 429 IPC were not even prima facie attracted, and only in exercise of power under Article 142, given the gravity and magnitude of the incident, examined whether the material could support a charge under Section 304A. The facts here were poles apart: the deaths were purely accidental and no prima facie case arose even under Section 304A, let alone Section 304 Part II; in any case the committing Magistrate had confined the allegations to Section 304 Part II. (¶¶ 17, 17.1, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4)
Result
Appeal allowed; the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune dated 01.04.2017 and the High Court's judgment dated 02.11.2017 set aside and quashed; the discharge applications (Exhibits 6 and 10) allowed and the appellants discharged from Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014.