CHUNNI BAI versus STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

Summary

A mother convicted under Section 302 IPC for killing her daughters aged five and three with an iron crowbar. That she caused the deaths was proved by an eyewitness, corroboration, recovery of the blood-stained weapon and medical evidence. But her Section 313 CrPC plea of acting under an 'invisible power', the total absence of motive in a loving, normal household, her remorse, her not fleeing, and an unexamined police statement that she had recently been babbling and taken to a psychiatrist raised reasonable doubt about intention to cause death. Without medical evidence Section 84 IPC could not found an acquittal, but the conviction was altered to Section 304 Part II with sentence of the period undergone. Trial courts should use Section 165 of the Evidence Act to question witnesses when such inexplicable circumstances or pleas of even temporary unsoundness of mind arise.

Issues

1. Whether the prosecution proved that the appellant caused the death of her two daughters.
2. Whether the homicide was murder under Section 300 punishable under Section 302 IPC, or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC, that is, whether intention or conscious knowledge constituting mens rea was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Whether the plea of acting under the influence of an 'invisible power' attracted the exception of unsoundness of mind under Section 84 IPC, and what burden the accused bears under Section 105 of the Evidence Act.
4. What significance the absence of motive carries where the accused's plea raises concern about her mental stability.
5. Whether the trial court ought to have used its power under Section 165 of the Evidence Act to examine the mental condition disclosed in a witness's Section 161 CrPC statement, notwithstanding the bar in Section 162 CrPC.

Provisions considered

• Sections 299 and 300, Indian Penal Code, 1860Culpable homicide is the genus and murder its species; the distinction turns on the presence or absence of intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or conscious knowledge of an imminently dangerous act done without excuse. Where that intention is not clear the case falls in the less stringent category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. (¶¶ 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 59)
• Sections 302 and 304 Part II, Indian Penal Code, 1860Intention to cause death having not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the case fell within culpable homicide of the third degree; the conviction under Section 302 was converted to Section 304 Part II, which permits imprisonment up to ten years or fine or both, and the appellant was sentenced to the period already undergone without fine. (¶¶ 20, 21, 59, 60, 61)
• Section 84, Indian Penal Code, 1860The provision covers legal, not medical, insanity: only a person who at the time of the act was incapable of knowing its nature or that it was wrong or contrary to law escapes liability; mere odd behaviour or ailments affecting emotions do not suffice. Beyond her plea the appellant led no evidence of unsoundness of mind, and in the absence of conclusive medical evidence the exception could not be applied to acquit her. (¶¶ 27, 33, 34, 58)
• Section 105, Indian Evidence Act, 1872The burden of proving circumstances bringing the case within a general exception lies on the accused, on a preponderance of probabilities; it may be discharged from the prosecution evidence without leading defence evidence, and even if insanity is not established the evidence may raise a reasonable doubt about mens rea entitling the accused to the benefit of doubt on that ingredient (Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar). (¶¶ 28, 29, 30, 31)
• Section 165, Indian Evidence Act, 1872The judge's wide power to put any question to any witness or party at any time to discover the truth is not impaired by Section 162 CrPC (Raghunandan; Sidhartha Vashisht). The trial court ought to have used it, in light of PW-5's police statement, to question the parties and witnesses on the appellant's motive and mental state; trial courts should do so whenever inexplicable circumstances or pleas indicating even temporary unsoundness of mind emerge. (¶¶ 54, 55, 56, 63, 64)
• Sections 161 and 162, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973PW-5's statement to the police that the appellant had been babbling that she was 'Mata, Budi Dai' fifteen days before the incident and had been taken to a psychiatrist at Durg could not be used by the parties at trial because of Section 162, but the bar does not restrict the court's own power under Section 165 of the Evidence Act to put questions based on it. (¶¶ 53, 54, 56)
• Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973In her examination the appellant denied guilt and pleaded that she had been under the influence of some invisible power. That plea, though inarticulately expressed and unsupported by defence evidence, could not be brushed aside by the trial court and the High Court and had to be weighed with the surrounding circumstances. (¶¶ 10, 26, 34, 35, 52, 57)

Held

• The appellant's commission of the homicide was proved: the sole eyewitness PW-1 saw her striking the younger daughter with the iron implement while the elder lay bleeding on the bed, no one else being in the house; PW-16 and other relatives who arrived heard her crying that she had killed her children; the weapon recovered on her memorandum statement bore human blood per the FSL report (though the memorandum witnesses denied it); and the post-mortem showed homicidal head injuries by a hard, blunt object. There was no infirmity in the concurrent finding that she assaulted both daughters, causing their death. (¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 22)
• Whether an act is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder turns on the presence or absence of intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or of conscious knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, done without excuse. Where that intention or knowledge comes out clearly the case is murder under Section 300 punishable under Section 302; where it is not so clear it falls under Section 304 (State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya; Rampal Singh). (¶¶ 17, 18, 19, 20, 21)
• A person is ordinarily attributed the intention to cause the natural consequences of his act, and intention may be inferred from eyewitness, medical and recovery evidence. But that is a presumption; it may not be safe in every case because the act and its consequence may have been brought about by circumstances beyond the accused's contemplation or control. Where the accused pleads she acted under an influence beyond her control, the court must examine all the surrounding circumstances before concluding that intention is proved beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution must establish for both actus reus and mens rea. (¶¶ 23, 24, 25, 46)
• Section 84 IPC embodies legal, not medical, insanity: only incapacity at the time of the act to know its nature or that it was wrong or contrary to law exempts from liability; mere odd behaviour or ailments affecting emotions or judgment do not. Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act the accused bears the burden of proving such circumstances on a preponderance of probabilities, which may be discharged from the prosecution's own evidence without leading defence evidence; and even if insanity is not established, the evidence may raise a reasonable doubt about mens rea on which the accused is entitled to the benefit (James Martin; Dahyabhai). (¶¶ 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33)
• Though the plea of being under an 'invisible power' is not a legally recognised exception and the appellant led no evidence of unsoundness of mind, it could not be ignored merely because, as a rustic woman of limited education, she could not express her mental condition in a legal idiom. Untreated mental disorders are often misinterpreted in rural settings as spells or invisible forces, and in light of her strange, bizarre and inexplicable conduct there was no other plausible explanation than an impaired mental condition, which she described as the influence of an invisible power. (¶¶ 33, 34, 35, 36)
• Where direct evidence links the accused to the offence, absence of motive does not preclude conviction; but where the accused's plea raises concern about her mental stability, the existence or absence of motive assumes great significance, especially in a grave offence such as a mother killing her tender-aged children. All witnesses, including the husband, confirmed that she loved her children and had cordial relations with the family and a normal domestic life; none of the usual motivating factors for homicide existed. This complete absence of motive put a question mark on intention, and her crying and bemoaning the killing showed remorse and an impulsive, unpremeditated act rather than a deliberate one. (¶¶ 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50)
• The State made no serious endeavour during investigation to ascertain motive or intention, and the trial court brushed aside the Section 313 plea. Although a statement under Section 161 CrPC cannot be used by the parties at trial because of Section 162, the court's power under Section 165 of the Evidence Act to put any question to any witness or party at any time is wide and unimpaired by Section 162 (Raghunandan; Sidhartha Vashisht; Zahira Habibulla Sheikh). The trial court ought to have used PW-5's police statement about the appellant's babbling and psychiatric treatment to question the parties and witnesses; the High Court did not even refer to it. (¶¶ 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56)
• Taking together that the appellant was shouting that she was killing her children while doing so, kept crying afterwards that she had killed them, did not flee when left alone, had no motive and loved her children, the mother-child relationship, and the absence of any strained domestic relations, a reasonable doubt arose about the existence of intention, and hence mens rea, for causing death. Without conclusive medical evidence of her mental condition this was not enough to extend the Section 84 exception and acquit her, but intention of causing death cannot be said to have been proved. (¶¶ 57, 58)
• Applying the tests in Rayavarapu Punnayya and Rampal Singh, the case fell within culpable homicide of the third degree, covered by Part II of Section 304 IPC. The conviction under Section 302 was converted to Section 304 Part II and, the appellant having undergone more than nine years and ten months of custody against a maximum of ten years, she was sentenced to the period already undergone without fine and ordered to be released forthwith. (¶¶ 59, 60, 61)
• Guidance to trial courts: where an accused charged with homicide pleads that she acted under some invisible force, or the prosecution cannot explain what motivated the act, or the evidence discloses inexplicable, bizarre and unusual circumstances, the court should, even if the accused remains silent, invoke Section 165 of the Evidence Act to question witnesses to elicit the truth, because the offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as to mens rea as well as actus reus. Incapacity to make a conscious and informed decision, or unsoundness of mind even if temporary, may put a question mark on intention and may entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt as to intention, affecting the nature of the conviction and sentence. (¶¶ 63, 64)

Result

Appeal partly allowed. Conviction under Section 302 IPC converted to Section 304 Part II IPC; appellant sentenced to the period of custody already undergone (over nine years and ten months) without fine and directed to be released forthwith.