Summary
A decree for specific performance covered an entire property although the signatory executed the sale agreement only as his father’s attorney and independently owned half. The Court maintained findings on execution, consideration and limitation but restricted the decree to the father’s half-share. The purchasers knew the divided title and had not pleaded facts supporting estoppel against the attorney’s own share.
Issues
- Whether the attorney’s execution of the agreement bound his independently owned half-share.
- Whether the purchasers could invoke estoppel despite knowledge of the title and absence of supporting pleadings.
- What modification and consequential division of property were required.
Held
- Concurrent findings established genuine execution and payment of consideration; the blank-signature defence failed. The finding that the suit was within limitation also warranted no interference on the record. (¶¶ 16, 17)
- The agreement identified only the father as vendor and was executed by the son as attorney. It contained no undertaking disposing of the son’s own share. His role in executing and receiving payment for his father did not by itself convey that independent interest. (¶¶ 20, 22)
- Estoppel by conduct was unavailable because the purchasers knew the true equal-share ownership and had not pleaded the necessary facts. They could not claim an erroneous belief induced by the attorney about exclusive title in his father. (¶¶ 19, 20, 21, 22)
- Specific performance was confined to the father’s fifty-percent share; the decree concerning the other half was set aside. No consideration was refundable given the intervening manifold increase in property value. The trial court was to divide the property into equal proportions. (¶¶ 23, 24, 25)
Result
Appeals allowed to the stated extent. Specific performance was limited to half the property, without refund of consideration. The trial court was directed to divide the property equally between the parties within four months. No costs.